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INTRODUCTION
The centrality of the judicial process to the stability of society implies the
importance of what goes on in courts. Courts are not omnipotent oracles dispensing
justice according to their whims and caprices. They are guided by rules, both of
substantive and procedural law. The quality of justice obtainable in the courts, and
consequently the credibility of the judicial process, depends on the nature of these rules.
On the procedural side, many jurisdictions have detailed rules of evidence
which regulate what facts the court may receive in the adjustment of disputes brought
before it. The hearsay rule is one of such rules. It is essentially one of exclusion of
evidence. An old principle having its roots in the common law, the rule continues to
endure heavy criticisms. It is still a feature of the evidentiary process of many
jurisdictions.
The purpose of this work is to examine the application of the rule in the
United States and in Nigeria. Both are common law countries. However, the former's
legal system is more advanced than the latter' s. It is thus thought that a comparison of the
rule as it applies in both jurisdictions would inform, and help, current reform efforts in
Nigeria. Similarly the work will be a ready source of education on this aspect of
evidence.
It is divided into four chapters. The first examines the meaning of hearsay
and the rule against hearsay evidence. The second chapter explores the theoretical and
practical justifications for the exclusion of hearsay evidence. There are numerous
exceptions to the rule precluding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Chapters three
and four are devoted to some of these exceptions. A conclusion follows.
Unlike Nigeria's federalism, the component states in the United States
have autonomous legal systems. Each state has its own rules of evidence. There also
exist the Federal Rules of Evidence. Most states have adopted the Federal Rules. The
work concentrates on the Federal Rules of Evidence which are used as a model for the
United States. In some instances the comparison between the two jurisdictions is made
within the text of particular titles or subtitles. In others, separate examinations are made
of the respective positions in the jurisdictions.
CHAPTER I
DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
A. What is Hearsay Evidence ?
It may appear a little doctrinaire to focus on the meaning of hearsay
evidence. Some may argue that even without a conceptual definition of the subject,
practitioners and judges, who grapple with it, can recognize hearsay evidence when they
confront it. Yet, as the avalanche of literature on the subject, and plethora of cases, show,
much of the perplexity involved in the regime of hearsay derives from the
characterization or non-characterization of evidence as hearsay. Indeed, judges often
make hairsplitting distinctions as to whether a piece of evidence is hearsay or non-
hearsay.
Consistent with the confusing lot of all aspects of hearsay, its definition is
as controversial as is the direction of reform of the rule. Professor Roger Park asserts that
"a perfect hearsay definition is unattainable."' This is not surprising, after all it has been
suggested that hearsay pervades all aspects of life and that "implicit in all testimony is
one type of hearsay that forms the basis for all of our perceptions and that cannot be
removed."' So entrenched is hearsay in our quotidian existence that a commentator
suggests that "the rule treating hearsay as presumptively inadmissable if applied to all
hearsay would be epistemologically suicidal."^ Sure hearsay may feature in our daily
Roger C. Park, I Didn 't Tell Them anything About You: Implied Assertions as
Hearsay Under the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783,794
(1990)
Mary Morton, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide, 74 Geo. L.J. 1301
(1986); Charles T. McCormick, The New Code ofEvidence of the American Law
Institute, 20 Tex. L. Rev.66 1 , 67 1 ( 1 942)
Mary Morton, supra note 2, at 1305
lives but in the context of the litigation process, different and, some would say," more
important considerations come into play. As Moorehead rightly argues, "regardless of
the magnitude of the nonjudicial decision... the use of hearsay in court differs from its
use in daily life in three significant respects."^ First, in the ordinary setting the decision
maker, usually a person, has a lot more information on the circumstances than does the
trier of facts in a court setting. These information enable him to ascribe reliability or
unreliability to hearsay. Secondly, the outcome of a trial in a court setting has more far
reaching implications than do private or personal decisions. Thirdly, in the litigation
setting, the decision has a corporate nature which may result in the imposition of penalty
by the state and the possibility of an un-rectifiable mistake. The very integrity of the
system may be at stake if a decision is based on questionable hearsay. One may add that
in personal matters, it is easier to correct wrong decisions or indeed to suffer such
mistakes with equanimity. Not so for a "corporate" judicial system. Correction, if
available, may only be at the cost of tortuous appeals. And such mistake may occasion
miscarriage ofjustice which strikes at the very root of society.
As a result, notwithstanding the prevalence of hearsay in every day
activities, it is important, when it comes to the trial process, to isolate the concept for
special treatment. This much is conceded even by the proponents of the pervasiveness of
hearsay.^ However, this overlap bedevils the definition of hearsay which is as varied as
scholars on the subject.
See James D. Moorehead, Compromising the Hearsay Rule: The Fallacy o/Res
Gestae Reliability, 29 Loy. L.A.L. Rev 203, 224 (1995); Christopher B. Mueller,
Post Modern Hearsay: The Importance ofComplexity, 76 Minn. L. Rev 367 383-
384(1992)
Moorehead, supra note 4, 223 - 224
Mary Morton recognizes the need for this distinction. Thus she distinguishes
between implicit hearsay and explicit hearsay, the latter being the concern of legal
commentators. See Mary Morton, supra note 2 at 1306
The hearsay concept arose as part of common law.^ And like most
common law concepts, experience and practice were first, while analysis and
conceptualization came later. An eminent scholar, and one of the earliest writers on the
subject of evidence, Stephens, formulated the hearsay rule thus:
A statement oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in giving
evidence, and statement contained or recorded in any book, document or
record whatever, proof of which is not admitted on other grounds, are
deemed to be irrelevant for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
stated.^
The editor of Phipson's Law of Evidence perceives the matter this way: "oral or written
statements made by persons who are not parties and are not called as witnesses are
inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter stated" '^. A more contemporary common
law writer criticizes both definitions. Sir Rupert Cross argues that Stephen's formulation
would tend to regard a witness' narration of his out of court statement as hearsay. '° He
contends that this will be wrong since where a witness repeats his out of court statement,
it is usually to show consistency and not for the truth of the statement. He rightly levels
two criticisms against Phipson's definition. First, the definition would seem to exclude a
party's reported statement and to remove admissions and confessions from the purview of
hearsay. Secondly, the expression "persons who are not called as witnesses" may suggest
that the repetition, by one witness, of an out of court statement of another witness would
10
For a brief description of the development of the concept see Edmund Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application ofthe Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
177, 179(1948)
DIGEST OF LAW OF EVIDENCE, Art 15
PHIPSON'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, 271 (10th ed)
RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE, 490 (1970)
not be hearsay. This cannot be so. In defining hearsay, Morgan seems to emphasize its
dangers. Thus he states that:
Analytically, an utterance offered for a purpose which requires Trier to
treat the utterer as a witness is hearsay unless the uterrer was, when
making it, subject to all conditions prescribed for witnesses."
As will be shown later, the principal concern about hearsay is the seeming unreliability of
such evidence. Such unreliability arises from the fact that the normal conditions
prescribed for witnesses are usually lacking in the case of hearsay. Yet it is conceptually
misleading to view hearsay only as evidence or statements made otherwise than under
prescribed conditions for witnesses. For instance, evidence given in a previous judicial
proceeding which is tendered in a subsequent proceeding will be hearsay. And this will
be so notwithstanding that in the previous proceeding the normal conditions prescribed
for witnesses obtained. In this respect Morgan's definition will appear a little restrictive.
These illustrate the difficulty associated with definitions generally and
with defining a concept as controversial as hearsay. If scholars have had problems
defining hearsay, how have legislatures faired? We shall consider the statutory definition
of the concept in the two jurisdictions, United States and Nigeria. The Federal Rules of
Evidence is taken as paradigmatic of the United States position. It is also realized that
some states have not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Edmund Morgan, supra note 7, at 1 79
i. Definition Under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence attempt a fairly detailed definition of
hearsay. In doing so it also specifically provides for statements which would not be
considered as hearsay. This thorough scheme is enacted by Rule 801 which states:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
It has been suggested that the objective of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to whittle
down the hearsay concept to something much narrower than its common law original.'^
Yet others, like Weissenberger, believe that "a central problem of the hearsay system, if
not the singular problem of greatest magnitude, is that the evolution of the common law
has given contemporary evidence law an excessively dense and overburdened hearsay
definition."'^ Given the fact that common law is the progenitor of modem evidence
jurisprudence, it is suggested that whilst it is desirable to continually improve on rules of
evidence a clean break with common law is hardly realistic. Nonetheless, as subsequent
discussion will reveal, the Federal Rules of Evidence do depart from common law in
important respects.
A close analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence definition reveals that
for evidence to be characterized as hearsay it must be
'^ Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Definition ofHearsay in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 49, 51 (1982)
'^ Glen Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition ofHearsay, 57 Ohio St. L.J.
1525, 1533(1996)
8(i) a statement;
(ii) made by a person other than while testifying at the trial or hearing; and
(iii) offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
On the surface, this analysis appears straightforward, but the determination of the content
of each ingredient of the definition does present confusion and disagreement.
(a) Statement
The Rules adopt a restrictive meaning of statement. For evidence to
qualify as statement it must be an assertion. The assertion may be oral or written. It may
also be nonverbal conduct provided the actor intended such conduct to be an assertion.
Unfortunately the word "assertion," which is dispositive of whether evidence is a
statement, is not defined. Certainly declarations and expressions of fact or opinion will
qualify as assertions and therefore statements under the first limb of Rule 801(a).
However doubts exist whether other verbal expressions like questions and exclamations
will so qualify. This problem collapses into the fate of conduct as statements.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, common law prevailed and the
hearsay rule applied to verbal statements and also to conduct. This expansive application
of the rule found expression in the celebrated English case of Wright v. Tatham}^ The
action involved the challenge of a will on the ground that the testator did not have corpus
mentis. The evidence offered by the defendant, propounder of the will, included several
letters that had been written to the testator by persons who had since then died. Although
the letters did not directly assert the mental competence of the testator, the defendant,
propounder, offered them all as relevant on the theory that their tenor and content implied
beliefs of the authors that the testator was competent because they addressed him as one
would address a normal person. The Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords held
the letters to be hearsay and therefore inadmissable. In the words of Baron Parke:
" 7A.&E. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 Exch. Ch.l837 aff d 5C. & F. 670, 7 Eng. Rep
559 (H.L 1838)
Proof of a particular fact, which is not of itself a matter in issue, but which
is relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person in the
mater in issue, is inadmissable in all cases where such a statement or
opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible..."
As always, hearsay questions dove tail into relevancy issues. Whilst Baron Parke's
statement is classic, it appears that the letters could also have been rejected on the ground
that they were not relevant.'^ Unfortunately, the interface between hearsay and relevancy
does not seem to receive extensive attention.'^ On the other hand the extensive scope of
the hearsay field has been explored. Indeed the Advisory Committee's Note alludes to
five categories of evidence which have been treated as hearsay at common law.'^ These
are (1) verbal assertions (2) assertive nonverbal conduct (3) nonassertive nonverbal
conduct (4) nonassertive verbal conduct (5) assertive verbal conducts offered as basis for
inferring something other than the matter asserted.
The Federal Rules of Evidence discriminate among these categories.
Evidence in categories (1) and (2) are characterized as statement and therefore can be
16
17
18
Id at 388-89, 1 12 Eng. Rep at 516
This is because they indirectly border on the opinion of the authors. There was no
suggestion that the authors were medical experts and it is doubtful if the issue of
sanity is a matter on which lay opinion can be received. However, it is arguable
that the letters were circumstantial evidence. The definition of "Relevant
Evidence" under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is wide enough to
cover circumstantial evidence.
But see G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About
Hearsay, 62 UMKC L. Rev. 1,14 (1993) (suggesting that every hearsay problem
can be recast into a Rule 401/403 problem); Olin Guy Wellborn III, supra note 12
at 62 (suggesting that all hearsay evidence could be viewed as a kind of
circumstantial evidence, and that all hearsay risk could, in that view, be
transmogrified into mere questions of weight.)
Wellborn III, supra note 12 at 51
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hearsay. For categories (3), (4), and (5), the Advisory Committee considered that they
would not present the usual hearsay dangers'^ of insincerity, mis-communication or faulty
perception. Therefore it was thought they could be admitted without any, or at reduced,
risks. "° On the other hand it has been contended that this claim is untenable. In an
illuminating article, Olin Guy Wellborn argues that an antecedent perception or memory,
which was faulty, is not cured by the manner in which the non witness may subsequently
demonstrate such perception or memory."' Furthermore, he notes that the danger of mis-
communication is more pronounced with conduct than with oral expressions.^' On the
danger of insincerity. Wellborn rejects the notion that because the out of court actor has
no intent to communicate by his conduct, he would not intentionally mislead.^^
Either side of the divide has considerable merit although it would be
difficult to imagine how a person would intentionally mislead unless he intended his
conduct to be an assertion. Given the considerable tension between statements and
circumstantial evidence there is need to maintain a delicate balance between the two.
Such a tidy logical balance is not very easy. Yet Rule 801 appears a fair compromise. To
urge an expansive and all inclusive definition of statement, and by extension hearsay,
would have the effect of legislating circumstantial evidence out of existence especially as
it is merely implied by Rule 40 1 . By making the intention of the actor the focal point, in
the determination of whether conduct should be treated as a statement, the Federal Rules
19
20
See Infra Chapter 2
See Wellborn III, supra note 12 at 93 citing several support for that view. See
also Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Ticket, 14 Vand. L.
Rev. 741 (1961); McCormick, The Borderland ofHearsay, 39 Yale L.J. 489
(1930); United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (ED KY 1980)
21 See Wellborn, supra note 12 at 61
'2
Id at 62
Id23
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of Evidence indirectly preserve circumstantial evidence. Like hearsay, circumstantial
evidence has its own dangers. Thus, the requirement of the caution, in some
jurisdictions,^'' that circumstantial evidence, to be acted upon, must admit of no other
conclusion or inference.
When evidence is a statement, enquiry usually shifts to the credibility of
the maker. Seldom does the meaning intended by the maker engage much attention. As a
result it would be unreliable to treat conduct, which the actor does not intend as assertion,
as a statement. On the other hand, by excluding such conduct from the purview of
statement, and consequently rendering it admissible, no greater danger is occasioned.
The trier of facts instinctively realizes that this is a matter calling for inference and
therefore requiring caution, so as to make the correct inference. In any event the
inference would belong to the trier of facts. And all things being equal he would take into
account other circumstances of the case, before drawing the necessary inference. In the
case of a conduct treated as statement, the inference is imputed to the actor.
It is conceded that such thin distinctions may sometimes lead to confusion
and in some instances hard cases. The latter may be illustrated by United States v.
Zenni^^ and United States v. Lewis?^ In Zenni, government agents answered the
telephone several times while searching the premises of the defendant. The unknown
callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting events. The defendant
24
25
26
Example Texas, See RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
AND EDWARD J. KIONKA, EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES, CASES AND
MATERIALS, 200 (3RD ed. 1991)
492 F. Supp. 464 (ED KY 1980)
902 F. 2d 1 176, 1 179 (5th Cir.1990); See also United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d
205 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Oguns, 921 F. 2d 442, 448-2, 449 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Long905 F. 2d 1, 1572, 1579-1580 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
United States v. Southard, 700 F. 2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1983) cert, denied 463 U.S.
823; United States v. Pasha, 332 F. 2d 193, 196-197 (7th Cir. 1964) cert, denied
379 U.S. 839
12
objected to the admissibility of the utterances of the betters telephoning in their bets, but
the court held that the uttrances were non assertive verbal conducts and therefore not
hearsay under Rule 801. They were thus admissible. In Lewis the issue was the
admissibility of questions asked by unidentified callers. Appellants had electronic pagers
at the time of thier arrest. Later the pager associated with Lewis beeped and the police
officer called the number displayed on the pager. The officer identified himself to be
Lewis. The person at the other end asked, "Did you get the stuff?" The officer answered
in the affirmative. Then the person asked "where is Dog?", to which the officer responded
that "Dog" was not available. At the trial, evidence revealed that Dog was the nickname
of the other appellant. On the admissibility of the questions asked by the unidentified
caller, the Court held that those questions did not qualify as statements under Rule 801
and were therefore incapable of being hearsay. They were consequently admissible }''
Even though on the face of the decisions, the defendants may appear to
have been prejudiced by the indirect "assertions" of the unidentified callers suggesting
that bets were placed on the defendant's premises (in the case of Zenni) and that the
defendants received drugs (in the case of Lewis), can it seriously be argued that the jury
,
or other trier of facts , should not know of the circumstances of those calls? A prudent
jury would then proceed cautiously being clearly conscious of the fact that the callers had
not ascribed any particular meaning to their questions. Suppose that the unidentified
callers had made direct assertions, any trier of facts would naturally dwell on the
27 See also United States v Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981) (treating non assertive
verbal conduct as non hearsay); United States v Snow. 517 F.2d 441 (9th
Cir. 1975) (treating an inscription in a briefcase as circumstantial evidence, not
intended as assertion, and therefore admissible)but contrast United States v Paceli,
491 F.2d 1 108 (2nd Cir.) Cert. Denied,419 U.S. 826 (1974); Park v Huff, 493
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974); Krulewitch v United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Teper
V Queen, (1952) A.C. 480 (P.C.) (which treated implied assertions as hearsay)
13
credibility of those callers. Thus, there should be a conceptual distinction between the
two scenarios. Rule 801(a) maintains that balance, even if it is a delicate one.
(b) The Statement must be made by a person other than while testifying at the trial
Consistent with the rationale for the hearsay rule, for a statement to qualify
as hearsay it must be made outside of the proceeding in which it is offered in evidence.
The typical situation is where a witness repeats, in court, what someone else told him.
However practical and analytical problems attend a situation where the out of court
declarant is a witness in the case in which his out of court statement is offered. Two
scenarios are imaginable. Suppose a witness. A, asserts what another witness, B, told
him. That will be hearsay. Suppose also that a statement, which A previously made, is
offered, in the case, through A himself.
Prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence, two views strove for mastery in
this respect.^* The first view held that in so far as the statement was not made in the
proceeding in which it was tendered as evidence, it was to be considered as hearsay."^
Therefore other things being equal, such statement was inadmissible. A contrary view^°
took the position that since the out of court declarant was available, and indeed a witness
in the proceeding, the underlying dangers, which necessitate the hearsay rule, disappear
thus eliminating the need to treat the out of court statement as hearsay. However,
'' See PAUL R ROSTHEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,322 (2nd ed 1979); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE S. 801, 190- 202 (4th ED 1996);
RONALD J. ALLEN AND RICHARD B. KUHNS, 1991 FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, 123 (1991); IRVING YOUNGER. HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET, 48 (1988)
^^ This view was represented by United States v Biener, 52 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa 1943).
See also People v Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P. 2d 1 1 1 , 68 Cal. Repr 599
(1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969)
'° 3A. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, S 1018 996; CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND
14
proponents of the first view would counter that the presence of the declarant is not
sufficient guarantee. They contend that even though the declarant may be cross examined,
the fact that the opportunity to cross examine did not exist at the time the statement was
made diminishes the efficacy of such cross examination.^' The Federal Rules of Evidence
appear to make a compromise between these two competing views. It states in rule 801
(d)(1) that:
A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness - The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and subject to cross examination concerning the statement and is
(A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other preceeding, or
in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of
identification of a person made after perceiving the person.
The effect of the above provisions is that certain prior statements of a witness are
admissible having been expressly precluded from the hearsay definition. This assuages
proponents of the liberal (second) view. However the rule prescribes conditions under
which these would be admissible:
1
.
The out of court declarant must be available for cross examination.
2. The statement must fall under any of three categories contained in the Rule ie it must
be proir inconsistent statement made under oath or prior statement consistent with the
witness' present testimony and offered to rebut an express or implied charge, against the
declarant, of recent fabrication, improper influence or motive, or a statement of
identification.
" ROTHSTEIN, supra note 28; CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND KIONKA, supra
note 24 at 581 citing Comer v State, 111 Ark. 156, 257 S.W. 2d 565 (1953)
15
All other prior statements appear excluded. The three classes of prior
statements are indeed exceptional in the sense of their high relevancy. To determine the
truth of a witness' present testimony it will be highly relevant for the trier of facts to
know that the witness had earlier made a statement inconsistent with his present
testimony. However, the limitation of the admissibility of such statements to those
"given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or in a deposition" is suspect. The gravamen of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is the assessment of
the credibility of the witness. To that extent, the evidence of a witness who had
previously made a statement inconsistent with his present testimony, but not under oath
or in a formal setting, is no more reliable than that of a witness whose prior inconsistent
statement was made under oath and in the circumstances described in the rule. ^^
A more fundamental issue is the use to which statements covered by Rule
801 (d) can be put. Many writers assert that they can be admitted as substantive
evidence." It is doubtful if by "substantive evidence" it is meant that the court can rely
solely on the prior statement of the witness. Suppose a witness who had previously made
a statement, now recants.^'* It is arguable that the witness' prior inconsistent statement
made under oath can constitute positive evidence of the facts in issue. Allusion may be
32
33
34
The absurdity of the limitation was brought out in United States v. Palacios, 556
F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1977) where a witness' prior inconsistent statement, which
was signed was not admitted, not having been made on oath.
CARLSON, IMWINKERLRIED AND KIONKA, supra note 24 at 583;
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE,
S 8.24 at 862-863 (1995) (suggesting factors that court should consider in the
determination of sufficieny of such statements); JOHN WILLIAM STRONG (ed),
Mccormick on evidence, S. 251, l 18 (I992) citing Gibbons V. State, 248
Ga. 858, 286 S.E. 2d 717 (1982) and State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572,300 S.E. 2d
63 (1982) cert. Denied 460 U.S. 1 103 rehearing denied 462 U.S. 1 124
As happened in United State v. Biener, 52 F.Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa 1943) and United
States V. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964)
16
made to the case of United States v. DeSisto which is taken as having informed Rule
801(d).^^ In De Sisto, a witness' prior statements made first without oath" and twice
under oath'* were held admissible as proving the truth of what they asserted. Further
support that that is the intention on Rule 801(d) may be found in the restriction of
801(d)(A) to prior statements made under oath. Thus such previous statements may be
taken as going beyond the narrow scope of discrediting or rehabilitating a witness or
corroborating his evidence of identification, and that is the reason the rule prescribes all
the safeguards.
While such argument is plausible, there appears to be a logical risk in
picking and choosing the statements of a lying witness. In a criminal case the danger is
more heightened and should be sufficient to raise reasonable doubts in the mind of the
trier of facts. Thus it is ideal that despite the notional possibility of using Rule 801
statements as substantive evidence, they should be limited to the purpose of discrediting
or rehabilitating a witness or as corroborative evidence of identification. Nigerian law
favors use of such evidence only for purpose of impeachment and not substantive
evidence. ^^
(C) Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted
Traditionally, the determination of whether a statement is hearsay has been dependent on
the purpose for which it is offered in court. The controlling consideration is whether the
35
36
37
38
39
329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964)
See IRVING YOUNGER, supra note 28 at 63
The statement was made to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The statement was also made under oath before the grand jury and in an initial
trial
R V. Adeyemi, (1961) L.L.R. 79
17
statement is offered to prove the truth of what it asserts. The Federal Rules of Evidence
retain this test. Accordingly :
whenever a statement is offered for a purpose that does not depend upon
the veracity of the out-of-court declarant, because its value does not turn
on the truth of its content, it does not fall within the scope of the hearsay
rule.^"
The test appears to be whether there is a match between the assertion and what it is being
offered to prove."*' Sometimes it is easy to determine the purpose for which evidence is
offered. The substantive law and the ingredients or elements necessary to establish a case
prescribe these. As a result, one can discern the purpose for which evidence is offered by
referring to these. Indeed counsel may inform the court as to reason for adducing
evidence of a statement. That way the first element, ie. proponent's purpose, may be
easily appreciated and in fact be distinguished from the intrinsic assertion involved in the
statement.
The other aspect of the equation, the truth of the matter asserted, is more
problematic. The problems are an extension, or indeed a recurrence, of the overlap
between assertions and conduct. Conceptually, the dispositive consideration is the
intention of the declarant. A declarant's assertion may mean that which it literally says.
In such case the analysis is simple. It is hearsay if the proponent is offering the evidence
as truth of its intended meaning. Yet every statement asserts not only the point plain on
its surface but also some underlying points. Although Rule 801 seems to emphasize the
intent of the declarant, it has been rightly argued that an indirect assertion is hearsay if the
speaker meant to assert the point for which his statement is offered, and the task of the
court is to figure out his intended meaning, regardless of so called "plain meaning.'"*^
'° PAUL RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, 236 (3d ed, 1996)
^^ MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S. 8.12 at 818
'^
Id at 823
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Should the court's search be objective or subjective? Ideally, it should be
subjective and the enquiry will be what that particular declarant intended. But, as with
every attempt at determining intent, this may prove difficult. It is even more so since the
declarant is, usually, unavailable. Thus, the court would have to figure out, in the light of
the context and circumstances of a particular case, what the declarant intended. It is not
unlikely that the court would factor into its consideration what a reasonable person, in
those circumstances, would intend by such statement. This may be subjective enquiry,
but it does have an objective undertone.''^
The purpose of the assertion - truth of the assertion test is not always easy.
The borderland between when a statement is offered for its truth and when it is offered
just to show that it was made has sometimes produced results which some may consider
unsatisfactory. The usual situations'*" in which a court may deny that a statement is
offered for its truth are where it is otherwise circumstantially relevant as showing state of
mind"*' or effect on the hearer or demonstrating declarer's particular knowledge.''^
This seeming problem which had earlier been identified as the tension
between the hearsay rule and circumstantial evidence is illustrated by the case of United
States V Snow. ^^ The question was the admissibility of a piece of name tape with the
words "Bill Snow". The tape was affixed to a case containing a gun. It was a trial for
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For a similar view see Christopher B. Mueller, Post Modern Hearsay Reform: The
Importance ofComplexity, 76 Minn. L.Rev. 367, 416 (1992) (suggesting that
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PAUL RICE, supra note 40, at 237
United States v. Muscato, 534 F.Supp 969 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Posner v. Dallas
County Welfare, 784 S.W. 2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Armstrong v. State, 826
P. 2dll06(Wyo. 1992)
Bridges v. State, 19 N.W, 2d 529 (Wis 1945); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d
292(5thCir. 1981)
517F.2d44(9thCir. 1975)
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possession of unregistered firearm. The court held that the name tape was not hearsay but
instead circumstantial evidence/^ The decision appears unsatisfactory. Certainly the
person who affixed the tape to the case intended to say that the bag belonged to Bill
Snow. Since it was a case of possession, the fact to be proved was the ownership or
possession of the case. Therefore the name plate was offered to prove what it asserted.
Thus the assertion and the purpose of offering the statement coincided and it ought to
have been treated as hearsay.
The overlap between the two concepts will definitely continue, but much
depends on the courts which should avoid mechanical or legalistic interpretations of
intent and adopt a purposive attitude. This way statements which are offered as evidence
of their intrinsic truth would be caught by the hearsay rule while the province of
circumstantial evidence is at the same time not eroded.
ii Definition Under Nigerian Law
Before the advent of British rule, and consequently the establishment of
English style court in Nigeria, adjudication of disputes was carried out at different forums
ranging from informal family or village councils to customary courts presided over, in
some cases, by traditional rulers.'*'^ Although these courts dispensed justice fairly and
impartially and always preferred live testimonies to secondary evidence, there was no
technical rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. With colonialism came the introduction of
English model courts and the extension of English common law and doctrines of equity
48
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See also United States v. Saint Prix, 672 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1982) cert. Denied,
456 U.S. 992 (1982). For a criticism of this and similar cases, see Feriner, supra
note 17, 16-21
T. AKINOLA AGUDA, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 3 (3rd ed, 1989); See also
T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, (2d ed, 1963),
A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW (1963)
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to the country. ^° An incidence of this colonial nexus was the adoption, in Nigeria, of
English common law of evidence. By that fact the hearsay rule became applicable in
Nigeria.
However, in 1943 an Evidence Ordinance^' was passed in the country.
The ordinance became operative in 1945 and has been in force since then. It has been
restyled Evidence Act" and shall , hereinafter simply be referred to as "the Evidence
Act". There is an ongoing effort at reform of this Act. This has resulted in the
preparation, by the Nigerian Law Reform Commission, of a Draft Evidence Decree"
(hereinafter referred to as the "Draft Evidence Decree"). The Evidence Act is still extant
since the Draft Evidence Decree has not been enacted into law. But this work will make
reference to both instruments, the former representing the law as it is, and the latter
representing the direction of current reform efforts.
The Evidence Act was based on Stephen's Digest of the Law of
Evidence''' and therefore did not depart much from the common law. Besides, Section
5(a) of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall prejudice the admissibility of any
evidence which would, apart from the provisions of the Act, be admissible. This
50
This was done through the instrumentality of several provisions in what are called
reception statutes. Examples are Ordinance No. 3 of 1863, Interpretation Act,
Cap 89 section 45 High Court Law of Eastern Region, No 27 of 1955; High Court
Law of Northern Region No 8 of 1955; Law of England (application) Law of
Western Nigeria, Cap 60, Western Region High Court Law, Cap 44. See
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OKONKWO (ed), INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN LAW
^^ Ordinance No 27 of 1943
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provision enables inclusive rules of common law to apply where the Act is silent." This
is because prior to the enactment of the Act, such evidence was admissible and therefore
would qualify as "evidence which would apart from the provisions of this Act be
admissible"^^. It is noteworthy, though, that this provision is not authority for the
application of the English notion of the hearsay rule in Nigeria. The reason is that the
section only tolerates common law rules authorizing admissibility and not those
mandating inadmissibility. The hearsay rule is one of exclusion.
Having said that, three further points need be made. First, the Evidence
Act is not completely devoid of provision bordering on the hearsay rule. Secondly, the
courts continue to apply the common law hearsay rule, sometimes without reference to
the Evidence Act. Thirdly, the Draft Evidence Decree attempts an explicit and conceptual
treatment of the hearsay rule.
Section 77 of the Evidence Act provides.
Oral evidence, must in all cases whatever, be direct-
(a) if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a
witness who says he saw that fact;
(b) if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a
witness who says he heard that fact;
(c) if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in
any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he
perceived that fact by that sense or in that manner;
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(d) if it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is
held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those
grounds.
This is the nearest the Evidence Act comes to providing for the hearsay rule. On its face,
Section 77 appears severely limited in scope. This is because it deals with only oral
evidence. A strict interpretation of the section would entail that documentary evidence
cannot be hearsay. Section 76 seems to accentuate such conclusion. It provides that "all
facts except the contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence". The Evidence
Act's scheme maintains a distinction between relevancy and admissibility (means of
proof). It is possible to interpret the two provisions as allowing oral evidence to prove
relevant facts. But when the relevant fact is the content of a document, then the
document itself is to be produced.
Unfortunately, unlike in the United States, the courts in Nigeria have shied
away from analysing and applying the provisions of sections 76 and 77 of the Act.
Instead they still apply the common law doctrine of hearsay. Thus Nigerian courts make
frequent allusion to the statement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor.^ ^ The Committee had stated:
Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called
as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the
object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to show by the
evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.58
The judicially accepted definition of hearsay in Nigeria is evidence of a statement made
to a witness by one who is not himself called as a witness and which is offered to prove
" (1956) 1 W.L.R. 965
'' Id at 969
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the truth of the statement.''^ Similarly, notwithstanding the narrow confines of Section 77
of the Evidence Act, the courts extend hearsay to statements contained in documents.^"
Whilst the substance of the definition of hearsay in both jurisdictions.
United States and Nigeria, do coincide, it appears prevailing doctrine in Nigeria does not
attempt an exhaustive treatment of the niceties of the definition as obtainable in the
United States. Conceptual issues, such as the scope of the rule, and its application to
conduct, have received minimal judicial and even academic examination/' It is against
this backdrop that one appreciates the attempt of the Draft Evidence Decree to elevate the
hearsay rule to a conceptual level. The decree takes the rule beyond the simplistic notion
of whether evidence of out of court statement is offered as proof of its truth. It defines
hearsay and enumerates situations of its admissibility. Even if not entirely satisfactory,
the definition offered by the decree is an improvement on current regime which is marked
by confusion and resort to common law.
Section 33 of the Draft Evidence Decree provides:
Hearsay means a statement
a) oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding;
(b) contained or recorded in a book, document or record whatever proof of
which is not admitted under any provision of this Decree
which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the matter stated
in it.
" Abadom v State, (1997) 1 N.W.L.R. (Part 479) 1 C.A.; Nwoobosi vA.C.B. Ltd,
(1995) 6 N.W.L.R. (Part 404) 658 S.C.
'° Armel Transport Ltd v Martins, (1970) 1 ALL N.L.R.27
^' Aguda doubts whether the rule and its exceptions are part of Nigerian law (See
AGUDA, supra note 49, at 60 ) while Nwadialo expresses the view that Section
77 of the Evidence Act embodies the hearsay rule and that although its provisions
deal with oral evidence, its underlying principles govern documentary evidence as
well (See NWADIALO, supra note 55 at 98)
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Three points emerge from this definition. First, the evidence must be a statement.
Secondly, it may be made otherwise than in a proceeding or be contained in a document.
Thirdly, it must be offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter stated in it. The
definition accords with that contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The controversy
as to the scope of statement may also arise and is not mitigated by Section 260( 1 ) of the
decree which defines "statement" to include any "representation of fact whether made in
words or otherwise." This would cover conduct. Although nothing is said about intention,
unlike is done under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the definition contained in Section
260(1) seems to imply intention. A representation involves the intention of the
representor. Therefore, if the decree is enacted into law the courts will be justified to
exclude, from the purview of hearsay, any conduct which the actor does not intend as a
representation of fact.
A troublesome aspect of the definition is the phrase, "made otherwise than
by a witness in a proceeding", contained in Section 33(a) of the Draft Decree. This is a
reflection of one the problems that plague the hearsay doctrine. There is an
understandable ambivalence in the treatment of testimony given in a prior judicial
proceeding.''' Mechanical approach will regard such evidence as hearsay if offered in a
later proceeding for its truth. On the otherhand, since the hearsay dangers are reduced,^"^
purposive interpretation would regard such evidence as non hearsay. It is arguable that
the Draft Evidence Decree prefers the purposive approach and therefore does not regard
such evidence as hearsay. Yet this line of reasoning is fraught with difficulty and is not
62
63
IRVING YOUNGER, supra note 28 at 48
See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE S 1370 (Chadboum rev. 1974). Presumably the
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consistent with the general scheme of the decree.''^ It compHcates analysis. A better
compromise is to regard such evidence as hearsay but allow its admissibility as an
exception to the rule. Indeed that appears to be the intendment of the decree. This is
because Section 42 makes provision for the admissibility, under certain coditions, of
evidence given in a prior judicial proceeding. This creates an exception to the rule
precluding hearsay. The seeming removal of such evidence from the definition of hearsay
is therefore not only conceptually unsound but also at variance with the general tenor of
the decree.
Another curious point is that contained in Section 33 (b). It will be
recalled that the section provides that hearsay means a statement "contained or recorded
in a book, document or record whatever proof of which is not admitted under any
provision of this Decree..." There is a measure of contradiction in the provision.
Apparently the section recognises written hearsay. Thus it talks of statement "oral or
written" and of statement "contained or recorded in a book, document or record." In the
history of hearsay and its numerous exceptions, documents feature significantly. Whether
a document is admissible or not, its contents are assertions by its maker.^'' Again it clogs
analysis to exclude some documents from the purview of the definition of hearsay
simply because they are rendered admissible by the decree. It appears that a general
shortcoming of Section 33 of the Draft Evidence Decree is its inability to maintain a
conceptual distinction between what is hearsay and what is admissible hearsay. The
characterization of evidence as hearsay does not conclusively render it inadmissible. As
^^ The decree defines hearsay, prohibits its admission in evidence but makes exceptions
for situations where hearsay can be admitted.
^^ However it can be argued that consistent with the relevancy - admissibility dichotomy,
where the content of a document is itself the fact in issue then production of the
document is not hearsay as the fact to be proved is the statement contained in the
document and not the truth of the statement.
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the decree itself recognizes, there are many exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay. Yet
these exceptions should not influence the determination of whether evidence is hearsay.
B. Prohibition against Hearsay Evidence
The tenor of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and of current law in
Nigeria is that of a general prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay evidence. It is
said that to every general rule there are exceptions. That statement cannot be truer with
any rule in law than it is with the hearsay rule. The rule has become so harmstrung with
exceptions that some argue that it should infact be the exception rather than the rule.^^ In
other words that hearsay is admissible except in certain circumstances. However, current
doctrine in both jurisdictions still regard the general rule as that of exclusion. Rule 802 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by
Act of Congress." Similarly, Section 34 of the Draft Evidence Decree provides that
"Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided in this part of this Decree or by
any other enactment." We had earlier alluded to the fact that the Evidence Act does not
contain any express provision on the hearsay rule but that the rule can be implied from
Section 77 of that Act. As subsequent discussion will reveal, both jurisdictions reject an
absolute approach to the ban on hearsay. This attitude is reflected even in the provisions
rendering hearsay inadmissible.
^^ Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 Litig. 13, 13- 17 (regarding the exclusion of
hearsay as a fiction)
CHAPTER II
RATIONALE FOR THE PROHIBITION AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
It can be asserted that hearsay is viewed with suspicion in both
jurisdictions. This is because it is thought to be less reliable than live testimony.^'
However critics canvass that the thoery that hearsay evidence is inherently weak and
untrustworthy is spurious and a legal fiction^^ and that current doctrine of exclusion
cannot wholly be justified on the basis of a preference for live testimony. They point to
the fact that several of the exceptions, to the rule, do not require proof of unavailability of
the declarant.^^ Others argue that although hearsay may give inaccurate information it
does not give misinformation.^" Yet all seem to agree that the perceived weakness of
hearsay evidence derives from its susceptibility to what are now known as the four
hearsay dangers.^' These are the risks of faulty perception, faulty memory, ambiguity,
and insincerity.
Like all humans, a declarant of hearsay might have misperceived the event
in respect of which he spoke. Three concerns have been identified in this regard. ^^ One
centers on the speaker's sensory capacities, another on his mental capacities, ie ability to
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process and make sense of what he sees, and the third is the relevant physical
circumstances that might bear on the opportunity for him to observe the facts. For
instance if the speaker's sensory or mental capacity is impaired, or otherwise not
functioning properly, he might misconstrue an event or a fact which he observed.
Similarly if there were circumstances impacting negatively on his observation, his
utterance or narration may distort the fact. The concern with faulty memory is
understandable. Human memory is short and fallible. Ability to recollect, and therefore
to assert correctly, what may have been perceived, may be affected by several factors."
The declarant may confuse or conflate the fact with subsequent events and again this may
result in a distortion of the fact.
The third danger, ambiguity, is common with communication and the use
of language. It is difficult to use a language with precision. The speaker may say one
thing while meaning another. The hearer may misconstrue what the speaker said as
words may convey different things to different persons. Besides, the language used may
not capture the points of detail, qualification, or limit.''*
The danger of insincerity is based on the possibility that the speaker may deliberately lie.
Ancillary to this is that the in court witness may also deliberately lie by ascribing to a
"declarant" what the latter never said.
A remarkable point, however, is that every human is prone to the above
shortcomings. The live witness may have misperceived the events, his memory may be
faint and even the language he uses in court may be ambiguous. He may also
fraudulently misrepresent. Therefore, in a sense, the above dangers are not peculiar to
hearsay evidence. But the difference between the two, and therefore the explanation for
the current stricture against hearsay, is two fold. First, in the case of hearsay evidence
"
Id at 788-789
'^
Id at 789
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each danger arises at two separate levels. For instance, there is the danger of whether the
declarant misperceived the fact and also whether the hearsay reporter misperceived what
the declarant had said. There is the danger of whether the speaker remembers the fact
accurately and the danger of whether the in court witness accurately remembers what the
speaker said. The trier of facts has to worry about whether the declarant interpreted the
event properly and also whether the in court witness properly interpreted the statement
made by the declarant. We have already alluded to the dual nature of the insincerity
problem. Secondly, and more importantly, where direct evidence is offered the trial
process provides safeguards that reduce these dangers." These safeguards, or controlled
conditions,^^ help sift evidence and diminish, if not totally eliminate, these dangers. The
absence of these safeguards is regarded as the reason for the rule against the admissibility
of hearsay evidence. The safeguards are oath, cross examination, and demeanor.
A. Oath
In both jurisdictions, oral evidence in court is usually given upon oath.^' The underlying
reason for the administration of oath is that it will induce the witness to speak the truth
because a false testimony would earn them punishment in the world beyond. Similarly,
since the giving of false testimony upon oath is an offense of perjury in both jurisdictions,
the fear of prosecution and consequent punishment would reinforce the need for a witness
to speak the truth.'^ It therefore has a temporal as well as spiritual basis. Oath is an
answer to the danger of fabrication. The argument against hearsay is that since the
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declarant, assuming he made an assertion in question, was not under oath, there would be
no compelling reason to tell the truth.
However, some doubt the efficacy of oath as a stimulus to tell truth. Morgan notes:
What happened comparatively early to the oaths of compurgators has now
unfortunately happened to the oaths of a witness. The deliberate
expression by a witness of his purpose to tell the truth by a method which
is binding upon his conscience probably still operates as some stimulus to
tell the truth; but fear of punishment by supernatural forces for violation of
an oath is generally regarded as virtually non-existent, and the threat of
prosecution for perjury has little effect."
Others, while not worrying about the efficacy of oath, doubt if it is a true rationale for the
exclusion of hearsay evidence. They contend that if it is a true basis for the hearsay rule
then out of court statements made on oath would be admissible but this is not so.^° Still
others, like Wigmore, will subsume oath into cross examination:
It is thus apparent that the essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that
testimonial assertions shall be subjected to the test of cross examination,
and that the judicial expressions... coupling oath and cross examination,
had in mind the oath as merely the ordinary accompaniment of testimony
given on the stand, subject to the essential test of cross examination.*'
As we shall later see, not one rationale is controlling. It is possible that
not as many people today hold oath in as high esteem as was the case in the past. Yet
even for people without strong religious persuasion, the threat of perjury is sufficient
inducement not to lie. It is not uncommon for lawyers to remind witnesses that false
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testimony exposes them to prosecution for perjury. Certainly the absence of oath is an
important consideration in the hearsay rule.
B. Cross Examination
A significant feature of the adversarial process of litigation obtainable in both
jurisdictions is the right of an opponent or adversary to cross examine any witness called
by the other party. In some respects this right has constitutional undertones.*^ According
to Wigmore:
The theory of the hearsay rule is that many possible deficiencies,
suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness which lie underneath
the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and
exposed by the test of cross examination.*^
Wigmore, regarded as the paterfamilias of modem American evidence scholarship,*''
thought so highly of cross examination that he described it as "the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth."*' To him all other safeguards are subsumed in
cross examination. This fascination, with cross examination, is shared by many other
scholars who see cross examination as a "security for correctness and completeness of
*^ The Constitution of the United States guarantees the right to confrontation while the
Nigerian Constitution subsumes this in the right to fair hearing.
*'
5 WIGMORE, supra note 63 at 3
*^
Peter Tillers and David Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 813(1 992)
"^
5 WIGMORE, supra note 63 at 3
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testimony," *^ and as the best all embracing reason for the exclusion of hearsay
evidence. *' As a safeguard against the four dangers, cross examination discloses:
"all data helpful to the trier in determining (1) what information the
witness intends to convey to the trier by the language he uses (2) the belief
of the witness in the truth of his testimony, that is his sincerity (3) the
extent to which what the witness purports to remember is the product of
memory or of some other mental process such as reconstruction or the
mistaken adoption as his own of the experience of another and (4) the
extent to which what the witness testifies that he perceived corresponds to
what was then and there open to his observation or capable of being
perceived."*^
When evidence is put through the crucible of cross examination, the trier of facts would
be able to properly evaluate it and to ascribe the appropriate weight to it. The idea is that
if the witness misperceived the fact, cross examination will reveal this. If his memory of
the fact is defective this will also be apparent upon proper cross examination. And if his
language is ambiguous, in cross examination he might clarify the meaning which he
intends by his evidence.
The controversial issue is whether cross examination is an adequate
answer to fabrication. A lying witness has a tendency not to be consistent both with
surrounding circumstances and with prior statements. Therefore, ideally, cross
examination well conducted will reveal inconsistencies and enable the trier of facts to
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evaluate the evidence. Yet it has been asserted that "cross examination is probably less
useful in exposing fabrication than in exposing defects in memory and perception."**^ The
well schooled perjurer may be able to withstand cross examination but this is no reason to
deprecate the mechanism. Many a case are resolved on matters coming out during cross
examination. In majority of the cases, an effective cross examination will give away an
insincere witness. After all, in many jurisdictions, the cross examiner has very wide
latitude. For instance under the Nigerian Evidence Act he can ask the witness any
question:
(a) to test his accuracy, veracity, or credibility; or
(b) to discover who he is and what is his position in life; or
(c) to shake his credit, by injuring his character. ^°
There is no doubt that cross examination is an important safeguard. As Mary Morton
notes, it does not ensure that evidence is reliable, but "merely exposes the sources of
unreliability and provides a basis for evaluating testimony and determining how reliable
it is." ^' There appears a consensus that the absence of this important device is a principal
concern which informs the rule prohibiting hearsay. But it is not the sole basis nor is it
exhaustive. As we have seen, hearsay in the nature of evidence in prior proceedings is
generally prohibited although there are exceptions to the rule.''^ It is arguable that if the
absence of cross examination is the only basis for excluding hearsay, statements made
where an adversary had had the opportunity to cross examine will ordinarily be
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admissible. A counter argument would be that such prior opportunity for cross
examination would not suffice in a later case where the parties and issues may be
different. Nonetheless, it is farfetched to contend that the absence of cross examination is
the exclusive rationale for the exclusion of hearsay evidence. It is indeed a principal
reason, but is complemented by others.
C. Demeanor
By demeanor is meant the comportment of the witness while giving
evidence. The argument is that the solemnity of the court scenario and the possibility of
disgrace, coupled with the presence of the adversary, will deter falsehood and intimidate
witness to tell the truth. ^^ In another context, the demeanor of the witness helps the trier
of facts to evaluate his evidence and importantly, to decide whether he is truthful or not.
As Mueller and Kirkpatrick note, many mannerisms and human qualities come into the
comportment of the witness and an assessment of these points enable the trier of facts to
assess credibility and meaning. ^"^ The trier of facts will consider whether the witness is
composed or fidgeting. What is his facial expression? How does this witness generally
carry himself? All these and more '^ have a bearing on whether the witness is telling the
truth. They also help the trier offsets to evaluate the evidence.
There is a relationship between demeanor and the other trial safeguards of
oath and cross examination. The solemnity of the court room which induces witness to
tell truth may essentially derive from the oath taken, and demeanor is best evaluated
under cross examination.
"
Milich, supra note 65, 741-743
'^ MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S 8.3 at 792
'^
For more considerations see MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S
8.3 at 792
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Where a witness narrates what an out of court declarant said, the trier of
facts is deprived of the opportunity to observe the out of court declarant, who is really the
witness, the other merely being his conduit for transmitting the testimony. This
deprivation impacts on the evaluation of the evidence. The trier of facts will thereby not
have all the factors necessary for him to assess the evidence and ascribe weight to it. This
is yet another important concern of both jurisdictions which leads them to, as it were,
view hearsay with suspicion.
The above three reasons are traditional bases usually asserted for the
exclusion of hearsay. However, these are not exhaustive and to them may be added a
myriad of other reasons some of which are examined here.
D. Mistrust of Jury
A remarkable feature of the Anglo American trial process is the use of a
jury in the determination of facts. The essential characteristic of this practice is the use of
disinterested laymen in the resolution of disputes on facts. Here Nigerian Law parts
company with its Americn counterpart for although the jury system was practiced for a
short while in Nigeria, it no longer obtains and this rationale would not apply in Nigeria.''^
The perception is that hearsay evidence is excluded in order to "prevent
errant juries from basing an essential finding upon the slender reed of hearsay
evidence. "^^ There are two aspects to the argument. One is what may be termed jury
lawlessness ^* or simply misconduct. A jury that appreciates the unreliability of a case
,
but which is prejudiced, may find in hearsay evidence a peg on which to anchor its
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RUDD, supra note 77 at 132
Hart and Mc Naughton, Some Aspects ofEvidence and Inference in the Law. in
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 56 (LERNER (ed) 1958)
Park, supra note 89 63-64; Roger Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of
Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1986)
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decision and camouflage its prejudice. The second aspect is that the jury may simply
misperceive the hearsay and give it undue weight.^^
While these concerns are genuine, they are not peculiar to a jury and are
not supported by the history and evolution of jury trials. In the past, juries were free to
gather their own information and to use such information in their decisions. It was not
until about the middle of the eighteenth century that restrictions were placed upon the
sources of information usable by a jury. Morgan, after surveying the evolution of these
restrictions, points out that by this time:
The jury had been transformed from a body chosen by the court to
determine what the facts were from their own knowledge and from such
sources as they deemed reliable without any control from the parties to a
body which must depend solely on materials presented in court - most if
not all of them by the parties. In other words, the sources of usable
information were transferred from the control of the jury to the control of
the parties.
'°"
Not supported by the antecedents of the jury system, this rationale has also come under
fire from commentators who argue that jurors evaluate complex and sometimes technical
evidence, like DNA, and that after competent closing arguments, jurors should be able to
evaluate hearsay evidence."" Besides, some consider this rationale inconsistent with the
jury's function as the ultimate fact finders."^' There have been some studies on how
jurors perceive and treat hearsay evidence. Two such studies revealed that jurors do not
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Moorehead, supra note 4, 212-214
EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF, supra note 88 at 109;
See also Milich, supra note 68 at 741
Milich, supra note 68, 724, 725 and 771
Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 43, 66
(1994)
over value '°^ hearsay and are rather skeptical '"'' of hearsay. Although the researches are
not conclusive and in fact suggest further studies on the matter, their outcome is indeed
interesting for it may support both the abolition and the retention of the rule against
hearsay evidence. Proponents of the rule will readily argue that if jurors do disregard
hearsay evidence then it serves no useful purpose admitting such evidence. Opponents of
the rule will, on the other hand, argue that no prejudice or injustice is occasioned by
admission of hearsay evidence since jurors do not over value it. Indeed one of the studies
suggests that jurors should be provided with all evidence including hearsay. "^^ The
conundrum continues.
The problem is the seeming focus on jury competence, and even mistrust,
as if jurors are peculiarly disabled from evaluating hearsay. While one agrees with
Mueller, that no matter what is said about jury sophistication and universal education, the
claim that jurors can perform well without the benefit of demeanor evidence and cross
examination is suspect,'^'' the point must be made that no human, juror or non juror, is
imbued with the capacity to assess such evidence accurately. This is perhaps the reason
that the rule applies even to bench trials."'^ The underlying issue, which dove tails into
the four traditional dangers, is the difficulty of evaluation. Viewed in that context, the
concern with the jury is unanswerable.
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E. Unfair Surprise
Litigation is a gamble. The role of rules is to reduce the uncertainty and
unpredictability associated with it. If hearsay is freely admissible it becomes difficult to
prepare cases. A party would not know what evidence the other has. It is possible,
through discovery and deposition, to have notice of the evidence an opponent plans to
use. But where hearsay may be admissible the uncertainty remains and a party may
thereby spring surprise on the other. The hearsay rule operates to avoid such unfair
108
surpnse.
F. Unbridled Judicial Discretion
Similar to the rationale based on need to avoid surprise is the argument
that the hearsay rule avoids uncontrolled judicial discretion. The argument is not that
judges cannot be trusted but that being human "*'' they may be influenced by extraneous
considerations in the admission or rejection of hearsay and this may have serious
consequences on the outcome of cases. An objective way to curtail the influence of a
judge's personal predilection is the introduction of objective constraints such as are
erected by the hearsay rule.
However, as a discussion of the exceptions to the rule will reveal, the
hearsay rule merely reduces the judge's discretion. It does not totally eliminate it. Some
of the exceptions, like the residual exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, call
for exercise of judicial discretion. Even in Nigeria, where there are no residual
exceptions, a judge may still reject hearsay which comes under an exception if he
considers that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. "° The concern
'"^ Park, supra note 89 at 62; Park, supra note 98 at 1060; Mueller, supra note 43 at
396
'°^ Mueller, supra note 43 and 397
'
'" See Section 6 Evidence Act
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here is not dissimilar to that shown about the jury. An errant judge, like an errant jury,
can admit or reject hearsay as a cloak to cover his human prejudice. He may also be
mistaken. Again this concern is not peculiar to the field of hearsay. The litigation system
in both jurisdictions is yet to repose total confidence in the unbounded discretion of
judges. Thus in both civil and criminal processes, rules, regulating procedures, abound
and the judge's role is simply to administer these with minimal discretion.
G. Constitutional Rationale
In the province of criminal cases hearsay evidence comes against a
constitutional barrier. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation: to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.'"
This provision is said to be prone to several interpretations. "Witnesses" may mean
everyone whose statement is used against the accused. Secondly, it may mean the
witnesses that the prosecution choose to produce. Thirdly, it may mean all available
witnesses."^
Strictly interpreted, the confrontation clause would forbid all hearsay
thereby not only rendering the rule against hearsay redundant in a criminal case but also
stultifying prosecutions in many instances. However, a conspectus of the judicial terrain
reveals that the courts, notably the United States Supreme Court, evince an attitude
'" Compare with section 33 of the Nigerian Constitution
"^ Park, supra note 89, 88-89
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favoring the relevance of the rule and deferring to the exceptions. The constitutional
concern is with the need for a defendant to confront his accusers. The Court has held that
prior cross examination "^ and the opportunity for subsequent cross examination,"'' of a
hearsay declarant, would satisfy the constitutional requirement. The stance is apposite in
the atypical setting of a criminal case where the prosecution often desires to use evidence
given in a grand jury hearing.
For the general situations of use of an out of court statement, the court has
laid down a two pronged approach to determination whether or not such evidence will
implicate the confrontation clause. This was done in Ohio v. Roberts. "^ The first prong
is that the prosecution must produce the hearsay declarant or show that the declarant is
unavailable. Certainly where the declarant is produced the accused would have the
opportunity of confronting him. To show that the declarant is unavailable, the
prosecution must make good faith efforts to produce him. It appears whether good faith
efforts have been made is to be decided on the facts of each case. "^ The other prong of
the test is that the prosecution must make a showing of the reliability of the hearsay.
Here a statement is presumed reliable if it comes under a firmly rooted exception.
Two inferences arise from the second prong of the test. First, it means that
the prosecution has a burden of showing reliability of the statement if it does not come
under a firmly rooted exception. This would appear to be so even where the statement
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comes under an exception. The problem is that the category of "firmly rooted
exceptions" may be wide."' Secondly, it is arguable that a statement satisfying the two
pronged test may be admissible even if it does not come under a recognized exception.
While there seems not to have been a judicial endorsement of the point, the view appears
a regrettable implication of the tests. Unfair as it may seem, the consequence may be
logical if considered along with the Court's position that the accused may freely adduce
hearsay evidence which exculpates him. "^
It is clear that the restrictive attitude shown to hearsay does have
constitutional undertones. The confrontation clause, in criminal cases, and the right to
due process caution against free use of hearsay. In Nigeria, both come within the rubric
of fair hearing. In both civil and criminal proceedings parties are entitled to fair hearing
"^ and an essential content of this right is the right to confront adversaries. That hearsay
evidence negates the right is one of the reasons it is generally inadmissible.
H. Other Rationales
The category of rationales is not closed. Numerous other reasons are
proffered as justification for the maintenance of the rule against the admissibility of
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The following have been said to be firmly rooted exceptions: former testimony
{Ohio V. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Coconspirator exception {United States v.
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records (Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
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See section 33 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and
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hearsay evidence. It is, for instance, said that the rule protects the underdog '"" in the trial
process and prevents abuse of governmental power. '"' Besides, it is said to shift the
burden of tracking witnesses to the prosecution. '^" Professor Charles Nesson even
rationalizes the rule on the need for stability of verdicts and avoiding recanting by
witnesses. ''^ Others suggest that the niceties of the rule are hard to learn and cherished
once learnt. Therefore lawyers, who have spent much time and resources learning the
nuances of the rule, resist attempts to do away with it , so as to retain their competitive
advantage in the trial process. '^^
As a result of the presence of the four infirmities, hearsay evidence is not
just like any other evidence. '^^ It presents an intractable complexity and subtlety, '^^
requiring an unusual appraoch. The hearsay rule, even if seen as a rule of thumb,
performs the function of screening this extraordinary evidence. In doing so, it attempts to
answer the several concerns discussed above. No particular rationale is controlling but all
can be merged into the need to ensure that unreliable evidence is not received by the
court.
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797,801 (1992)
Mortimer R. Kadish and Michael Davis, Defending the Hearsay Rule, 8 Law
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CHAPTER III
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE
In maintaining a balance between the need for evidence, on the one hand,
and the equally important objective of preventing the use of unreliable evidence, the law
recognizes many exceptions to the hearsay rule. This is true for both jurisdictions
although the structure of the exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence is more
expansive and detailed than what obtains under Nigerian law.
The exceptions are usually rationalized on the bases of trustworthiness and
necessity. '"^ In other words the circumstances attending a particular kind of out of court
statement may be such as to significantly reduce the impact of the hearsay dangers and
thereby make it safe to dispense with all, or some, of the in court safeguards. The
statement may be made in circumstances where it is thought that the declarant would not
have the opportunity or desire to misrepresent or fabricate. It may also be made in
situations, and under circumstances, that the statement may safely be presumed accurate.
And, if a document, it may be assumed that the danger of ambiguity is minimized as the
document would speak for itself. As a result, in some of these cases, the law considers
that dispensing with the trial safeguards would not occasion miscarriage of justice.
Similarly, even though hearsay dangers may be present, the need for evidence may be so
acute that a choice has to be made between hearsay evidence and no evidence at all. Here
again the law opts to err on the side of admitting the hearsay evidence and then hope that
the trier of facts would properly evaluate it. Sometimes, too, one hearsay danger may be
heightened while the others are minimized.
'^^
Milich, supra note 68 at 726; Moorehead, supra note 4 at 246; Laurence Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 961-69; Park, supra note 89, 69-73
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Necessity and trustworthiness surely underlie the exceptions but some
argue that they do not explain all the exceptions. Such commentators point to
admission.'^* They suggest that admission receives non hearsay treatment simply on the
basis of the adversarial process. Although admission need not be against the party's
interest, it is usually so. Besides, the reason the adversarial process treats admission as
binding is the likelihood that it would be true. So, to that extent, it is founded on
trustworthiness. Others argue that there may not be any intrinsic reliability in the
exceptions and that they are simply treated as exceptions because of the social consensus
that these types of evidence are reliable and can be evaluated by jurors. '^^ It is possible
to vary the underlying themes of the exceptions and to focus on the several integral
aspects of those themes, but if a broad statement of the justification, for the various
exceptions, can be made, it is that the exceptions are maintained because of necessity and
their seeming reliability.
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain twenty nine exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Five of these exceptions require a demonstration of the unavailability of the
declarant while the others do not. The remaining part of this chapter is devoted to a
consideration of a select few of the exceptions that do not require proof of unavailability
of the declarant. It also considers the Nigerian equivalents of those exceptions. The
exceptions requiring proof of unavailability of a declarant will be treated in Chapter IV,
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EXCEPTIONS NOT REQUIRING PROOF OF UNAVAILABILITY OF
DECLARANT
A. Exceptions Based on the concept of Res Gestae
Defining the concept of res gestae is perhaps one of the most difficult
tasks in evidence scholarship. Like the organism amoeba, which has so many shapes and
is therefore considered to be shapeless, res gestae covers so wide a variety of evidence as
to be incapable of legal definition. An English judge once saw it as providing "a
respectable legal cloak for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision can be
applied." '^" It is used to describe statements, and in some cases acts, "so spontaneous as
to be considered part of a transaction rather than merely a witness's account of it." '^'
Admissibility of res gestae evidence is based on the theory that the
proximity, in terms of time, of the statement to the transaction and the fact that the
declarant may have acted under the stress produced by the event respectively enhances its
accuracy and forecloses, or at least diminishes, the possibility of fabrication. '^' This
notwithstanding, res gestae is vilified and regarded with disdain because of its vague
nature. '^^ Wigmore expressed the distaste thus:
This phrase is inexact and indefinite in its scope, and ambiguous in its
reasons for the doctrine... The phrase res gestae has long been not only
extremely useless but even positively harmful. It is useless because every
rule of evidence to which it has ever been applied can be explained in the
terms other than that principle. It is harmful because its ambiguity invites
the confusion of one rule with another and this creates uncertainty as to the
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limitations of botli. It ougiit therefore to be wholly repudiated as a vicious
element in our legal phraseology. There are words enough to describe the
rules of Evidence. Even if there were no accepted name for the doctrine
any name would be preferable to an empty phrase so encouraging to
looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision. '^"*
Despite these criticisms, res gestae has remained fairly resilient. All that has been done
is the removal of the term from the Rules of Evidence while retaining the substance. '^^
In a sense, however, the concern of scholars, like Wigmore, has been met. The Federal
Rules of Evidence does not use the term and the four specific exceptions that incorporate
the substance of the concept appear to have clearly distinct and fairly demarcated spheres.
Overlapping may exist but is minimal. These exceptions are present sense impression,
excited utterance, then existing mental, emotional or physical condition or state of mind.
i. Present Sense Impression
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness (1) Present sense impression. A
statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
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For hearsay statement to be admissible under tliis rule, three foundational
requirements must be satisfied. '^^ First, the declarant must have perceived an event or
condition. It seems "event" or "condition" covers any relevant fact which is to be proved
by the statement. The declarant must have personally perceived the fact. It is doubtful if
this requirement excludes the use of multiple hearsay. Suppose A perceives an event and,
contemporaneous with the event, makes a statement describing it, which statement is
heard by B (the declarant) who immediately echoes it. Would the statement, made by B,
be admissible under Rule 803(1) ? It seems that provided the initial statement, by A, can
be admitted as present sense impression, or indeed under any other exception, B"s
statement will be admissible as double hearsay under Rule 805.
Secondly, the statement must describe or explain the event or condition. It
is usually simple to determine whether a statement describes an event or condition. A
mere narration of the event or condition will suffice. However the term "explain" appears
wider and is said to cover situations where the statement interprets or assesses an event or
condition.'^^ In this respect that term expands the scope of the exception and inches near
the exception for excited utterance which requires a statement merely to "relate" to a
startling event or condition.
The third and most significant requirement for admissibility of a statement
as a present sense impression is that the statement must be contemporaneous'^* with the
event or condition. While it is ideal that the statement be made concurrently with the
event or condition, which it describes or explains, account is taken of the possibility that
an event may be so fast that a description and an explanation may simply not keep pace
"' MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, s 8.34 at 915;
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803(3)(4) and (5), 370-372
'" MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, S 8.34 at 916
138 United States v Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979)
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with it. In that situation, the requirement is that the statement be made immediately after
the event or condition. It is a matter of judicial construction, and application, on a case
by case basis, what is "immediately thereafter". But courts should be strict and always
exclude statements when they cannot reasonably be said to describe or explain a presently
perceived impression. Otherwise Rule 801(3) may prove an indirect way of admitting
statements of recent perception, a proposed exception which was rejected by the United
States Congress as "unwarranted and not bearing sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness" ' ^^
Some courts require corroboration for a statement of recent perception to
be admissible'''" but a better analysis is that such statement is admissible even without
corroboration, although the absence of corroboration may affect the weight to be ascribed
to it. However in most situations the in court witness would be someone who was with
the declarant and also observed the event and condition. He would always provide
corroboration for the statement.'"" The underlying philosophy for the exception for
present sense impression is that it answers to the concerns of at least two of the hearsay
dangers. Its contemporaneity with the event or condition eliminates the danger of faulty
memory and time for reflection thereby precluding possibility of fabrication.'''^
"' See H.R. REP. NO. 650, 93d Cong., 1st sess. 6 (1973); See also Kenneth E. Kraus,
The Recent Perception Exception to the Hearsay Rule : A Justifiable Track
Record, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1525 (1985)
"° See Jones v State, 65 Md App. 121, 123-25, 499 A. 2d 511, 512-13 (1985), revM, 311
Md. 23,A.2dl69(1987)
'" MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S 8.34 at 915
"' Id at 914; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S 803.2 at 370; Passannanta, supra
note 128, 99-100. But see Quick, Hearsay, Excitement and the Uniform Rules
: A Reappraisal ofRule 63 (4). 6 Wayne L. Rev. 204 210 (1960), for a suggestion
that the spontaneity requirement does not necessarily guarantee trustworthines.
ii. Excited Utterance
This exception is contained in Rule 803 (2) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence which states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: (2) Excited utterance. A statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
For admissibility under this heading, there must be a startling event or condition.'"'
Whether an event is startling depends on each case, the test being subjective.'"" Usually
there would be an external event but the preponderance of judicial and academic opinion
is to the effect that the event may be proved by the statement, the admissibility of which
is in issue. '"^ Secondly, the event or condition must produce a stressful effect on the
declarant.'"'' Here again the test is subjective. The court is not to consider whether the
event or condition would have a stressful effect on a reasonable person but whether it did
have such effect on the particular declarant. The third foundational requirement is that the
declarant must have made a statement relating to the startling event or condition.'"^ It is
'"' Passannanta, supra note 131 at 108; MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33
S8.35at917;WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.8 375-376; See also
Morgan v Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that in determining
spontaneity court should consider the age, physical and mental state of the
declarant, the amount of time, the subject matter and characteristics of the event)
144 MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S 8.35 at 91
8
'"' United States v Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570-571 (7th Cir. 1986); Edmund Morgan, Res
Gestae, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 91, 100 (1937); MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 33 S. 8.35 at 923
'"' Passannanta, supra note 131 at 108; MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33
S. 8.35 at 917; WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.8, 375-376
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this statement that the proponent usually offers in evidence. This foundational
requirement is more liberal than that applicable to present sense impression in the sense
that the phrase, "relating to", has a wider connotation than its Rule 803(1) counterpart,
"describing or explaining".
Although, theoretically, the three foundational requirements are distinct, in
practice they tend to merge. The statement may at the same time be evidence of the
startling event, or condition, and of the stress of excitement. The rule does not expressly
stipulate a time frame for the statement.''*^ However, the requirement that the statement be
made under the stress of excitement operates to exclude statements made after the lapse
of sufficient time for the stress of excitement to cease. This is a question to be decided on
the facts of each case. It has been suggested that a statement made after a recurrence of
stress as a result of a reminder of the event or condition may be admitted although the
court has to pay close attention to the conditions.'"''
The reason an excited utterance is admissible is that the stress of excitement
momentarily numbs the declarant's ability to fabricate.'^'' Besides, it is thought that his
memory would still be fresh while he makes the statement.'^' Therefore the hearsay
dangers of insincerity and faulty memory are eliminated. If the elements of spontaneity
'^^ Neumer v Clinkenbeard, 466 F.Supp. 54 (W.D. Okla. 1978) ( statement, made seven
minutes after the event, was admitted); Guthrie v United States, 207 F.2d (19 D.C.
Cir. 1953) (statement, made eleven hours after the event, was admitted)
"' MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S. 8.35 at 921
"° WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.7 at 375; MUELLER AND
KIRKPATRICK,supra note 33 S. 8.35 at 916; Aviva Orenstein, "My God!" : A
Feminist Critique ofthe Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85
Calif. L. Rev. 159, 173 (1997); JACK B WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE S803(2) (01)
151 MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S. 8.35, 916-917;
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S.803.7 374-375
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and excitement, inherent in an excited utterance, are the raison d' etre for the exception,
they at the same time attract the strongest criticisms against the exception. It has been
argued that the assumption that descriptive accuracy is a natural consequence of
immediate observation, and that this accuracy is preserved by contemporaneous statement
under spontaneous exclamation, is inherently flawed.'" Instead it is noted that excitement
exaggerates and distorts.'" Moreover, people view observation made under emotion with
reservation. '^'' Secondly, it is argued that spontaneity is not easily measured after the fact
and that courts sometimes allow much time lapse. '^^ On the basis of these criticisms.
Professor Stanley Goldman concludes that spontaneous exclamation fails the test of
trustworthiness.'^^ He echoes the sentiment which Professors Hutchins and Slesinger
earlier expressed that "on psychological grounds, the rule might very well read: Hearsay
is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a spontaneous exclamation"'". Professor
Orenstein elucidates the objection to the claim of sincerity. She asserts that "if twentieth-
century intellectual thought has taught us anything, it is how intricate human thought and
awareness are, and yet how generally oblivious we are to their processes"'^^
Furthermore, she contends that the assumption, that an excited speaker would not
fabricate, ignores the vast cognitive process that go on as part of an utterance. '^"^ In
'" Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Exclamations as a "Firmly
Rooted" Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 453, 459 (1990)
'"Id at 461
"' Id at 462
"' Id at 460
"' Id at 463
'" Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law ofEvidence, 28 Colum. L.
Rev. 432,439(1928)
'^* Orenstein, supra note 150 at 179
''Mdatl78
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addition, the excited utterance exception is criticised as ignoring the experiences of
women and other allegedly dominated persons who deviate from the exception's
paradigm of quick report.'^" Orestein alludes to cases of rape and other sexual assaults
where studies have shown that the survivors are prone to be withrawn instead of making
spontaneous statements and reports."''
It is not possible to have an exception that is completely foolproof. Despite
the criticisms levelled againt the excited utterance doctrine, its significant merit is the
reduction of the insincerity problem. While excitement may lead to exaggeration, it
hardly conduces to outright fabrication. Guarding against a particular hearsay danger may
involve a fair compromise of another. The dilema of law has always been to weigh the
respective concerns. The danger of misperception, which may arise from the emotional
nature of excited utterance, is considered minimal. The peculiar attitude of survivors of
rape or other sexual assaults can still be accommodated under the current doctrine of
excited utterance. This can be done by an elastic interpretation of the stress requirement,
since such victims tend to experience the trauma for a long time. However there still has
to be a cut off point if the exception is to retain credibility.
iii. Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (3) enacts:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: (3) Then existing mental, emotional, or
physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.
''Mdatl61
'"Id 199-210
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This exception is expansive in the sense that it covers several states of mind.The ones
mentioned are merely illustrative, not exhaustive, of the states of mind that can come
under the exception. However, to be admissible, the statement must be made while the
particular state of mind subsists.'" The exception does not accommmodate statements
relating to past condition unless they relate to the declarant's will.
A controversial aspect of the exception is its tolerance of statement of
intent or future conduct and plan. Prior to the enactment of the exception, the controlling
principle was the Hillmon doctrine which held that a statement indicating the speaker's
intent to do something could be admitted to show that he did the thing. The doctrine arose
from Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon^ ^^ , which involved a life insurance claim.
The insurers resisted the claim on the theory that Hillmon, whose life was insured, was
still alive. The plaintiff had alleged that Hillmon had died as a result of accidental gun
shots from his companion, John Brown. The insurers argued that a third person, Walters,
had been killed so that the claimants could fake that as Hillmon's death, in order to
collect the insurance money. To prove that Walters accompanied Hillmon to Crooked
Creek, where the killing had occurred, the insurers offered two letters which Walters
wrote to his sister and fiance, respectively. The letters indicated that Walters was going
there with Hillmon. The United States Supreme Court held that both letters were
admissible.
The exception, contained in Rule 803 (3), retains the basic thrust of the
Hillmon doctrine: statement of declarant's intent can be used to prove that he acted
consistent with that intent. However, two other points are implicated by a juxtaposition
of the rule with the Hillmon doctrine. The first is the issue of whether Hillmon endorsed
'" WEISSENBERGER. supra note 135 S. 803.12 at 382: Passannanta, supra note 131 at
109
'" 145 U.S. 285,295-296(1892)
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what Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick term backward looking inferences."''' For
example the declarant asserts that he will have dinner with X tomorrow. This implies a
prior agreement, between the declarant and X, to have dinner tomorrow. A broad reading
of the Hillmon doctrine would permit this implication and therefore raise the question of
its survival under present doctrine. This is because Rule 803 (3) expressly excludes
statements of memory or belief from its scope. '^^ The other point is whether a declarant's
statement of intent can be used to prove subsequent act attributed to someone other than
the declarant.
The resolution of the first issue lies in an answer which Professor
Weissenberger surprisingly offers for the second point. '^^ That is the treatment of the
backward looking inference as non hearsay. Since intention is the dispositive factor in
determining whether conduct is a statement'^^ and consequently hearsay, the aspect of the
Hillmon principle that is backward looking does not qualify as statement.This is
grounded on the simple basis that what is uppermost in the declarant's mind, and which
he intends to communicate, is his future act. It is fortuitous that the statement of present
intent implies a previous act.
The use of the declarant's statement of intent to implicate another person
is clearly indefensible. It is even doubtful whether it is supported by the Hillmon
doctrine. In Hillmon the crucial issue was the presence of the declarant at the scene of the
killing. His prior declaration that he was going to that scene was properly admitted.
164 MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S.8.38 at 935
'^^ See Marshal v Commonwealth Aquarium, 611 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (declarant's
recounting of previous conversation was held not to be statement of present
intent)
'^^ Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles : An Essay on Federal Rule Evidence 803 (3),
64 Temp. L. Rev. 145(1991)
"^ See Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a) (2)
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Cases'^^ which have sought to use a declarant's statement of intent as evidence that,
subsequent to the statement, another person acted in a particular way are simply unfair
and do set a dangerous precedent. The prior agreement implicit in the statement of intent
is not conclusive of the other person's subsequent conduct. People do change their
minds.
Professor Weissenberger suggests that the use of a statement of intent in
this maimer can be rationalized on the basis of treating such statement as two fold, one
admissible under Rule 803 (3) and the other as non hearsay.'^'' The crucial question is
whether the declarant, at the time of the statement, could have had personal knowledge
of another person's subsequent conduct. Whether treated as hearsay or non hearsay, an
interpretation which leads to such illogical reliance on the statement ought to be rejected.
The rationale'^" for the exception is founded in both trustworthiness and
necessity. Such statement is likely to be accurate as it is made while the state of mind
exists. Besides, the declarant is in the best position to know his state of mind. But it can
be argued that the contemporaneity requirement, in this instance unlike under Rules 801
(1) and (2), does not eliminate fabrication. This is because the declarant knows that it is
difficult to verify the existence, or otherwise, of the particular state of mind.
A related exception is that for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Some regard this as also deriving from the res gestae doctrine.'^' Under Rule 803 (5)
"' People V Alcalde. 148 P.2d 627 (Cal.1944); United States v Pheaster. 544 F.2d 353.
374-380 (9th Cir. 1976) but some cases have held that a declarant's statement of
intent under Rule 803(3) cannot be used to prove another person's subsequent act,
see United States V Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331, 1335-1336 and n.2 (9th Cir.
1982); United States V Jenkins, 579 F. 2d 840, 842- 844 (4th Cir. 1978)
'^"^ See Glen Weissenberger, supra note 166
""MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK. supra note 33 S. 8.36 at 924
171 Glen Weissenberger, supra note 135 S. 803.18 at 391
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statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are admissible if they
describe medical history, or past or present symptons, pain, or sensations, or the inception
or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment.
'^^
B. The Res Gestae Exception in Nigeria
The common law doctrine of res gestae applies in Nigeria.Two reasons
account for this position. In the first place, as earlier mentioned, the Evidence Act, by
virtue of Section 5, allows the continued application of inclusionary, as opposed to
exclusionary, rules of evidence which were in force prior to the enactment of the Act.
Since the common law doctrine of res gestae enabled the admissibility of evidence and
operated in the country before the inception of the Act, Section 5 saves the doctrine.
There is judicial authority to the effect that the English doctrine of res gestae applies in
Nigeria.'^'' Secondly, the Evidence Act contains provision wide enough to subsume res
gestae. This is Section 7 of the Act which states that:
Facts which, though not in issue are so connected with a fact in issue as to
form part of the same transaction, are relevant whether they occurred at the
same time and place or at different times and places.
For evidence to admissible as forming part of the res gestae, it must be contemporaneous
with the fact in issue. Thus xn R v Bang Weyeku, ' ^-^ the West African Court of Appeal,
"' Id S.803.18 - S. 803.21, 390-397; See also United States v Iron Shell, 633 F. 2d 77
(8th Cir. 1980); United States v Nick, 604 F. 2d 1 199 (9th Cir. 1979); O'Gee v
Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F. 2d 1 084 (2nd Cir. 1 978)
"' R V Bang Weyeku, (1943) 9 W.A C.A 195; Akpan v State, (1994) 8 N.Wl.R. ( Part
361) 226 ( Nigerian Court of Appeal alluded to the res gestae doctrine)
"'(1943)9W.A.C.A. 195
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following the English case of R v Beddingfield,^^^ held that the statement "Bang has shot
me",which was made by the deceased shortly after he had been stabbed, was
inadmissible. This was because, the court reasoned that, it was not contemporaneous with
the fact in issue. '^^ In addition such statement must explain the fact in issue.
Two critical issues emerge from the application of res gestae in Nigeria.
The first is the scope of section 7 of the Evidence Act. There is considerable agreement
that the section is wider than the English doctrine oi res gestae^^\ This is clear from the
provision itself Under the section, the fact is relevant whether it occurred at the same
time and place with the fact in issue or at different times and places. This removes the
requirement of contemporaneity and ought to distinguish the provision from the common
law doctrine of res gestae. Yet the neglect of the section and the continued judicial
recourse to the res gestae doctrine robs contemporary evidence jurisprudence of guidance
and stultifies legal development. While the provision dispenses with the common law
stricture of contemporaneity, does that completely eliminate the issue of time or does the
requirement of connection with the fact in issue operate to retain some form of time
frame even if a liberal one? These are important questions but unfortunately answers are
lacking as courts still rely on res gestae.
The second issue is more fundamental and is the question whether section
7 actually provides an exception to the hearsay rule. There is the assumption that it
does."* This is based on the premise that a statement falling within the section or
175 (1879) 14 Cox C.C. 341; 70 L.T. 867
'^^ Contrast with Salawu v State (1971) 1 N.M.L. R. 249 (deceased said "Sule is killing
me". The witness rushed into the room and saw the deceased in a pool of blood.
The court admitted the statement "Sule is killing me" as part oires gestae.)
'" AGUDA, supra note 49 at 29
''* Most writers allude to it as an exception to the rule. The Nigerian Law Reform
Commisssion includes it in its list of exceptions to the hearsay rule ( See
Workshop Papers on the Reform of the Evidence Act supra note 52 at 63) But
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qualifying as res gestae may be reported by an in court witness other than the person
who made it. It is however arguable that what the section does is to make such statement
relevant. Being a relevant fact itself requiring proof, the evidence of the in court witness
who heard the statement, is thus admissible as being direct on the point. This problem is
one of the effects of the absence of a conceptual treatment of hearsay under the Evidence
Act. Much is left to inference. Although current reform efforts recognise the need for
express provision on the hearsay rule, the Draft Evidence Decree retains the provision of
section 7 which is re-enacted as section 4.
It appears that evidence admissible under the United States Federal Rules
of Evidence 803 (1), 803(2) and some parts of 803(3) are admissible under the robust
doctrine aires gestae and under section 7 of Evidence Act. The present sense impression
and excited utterance exceptions are, by their very nature, intertwined with the event or
condition which they describe or explain, in the case of present sense impression, or to
which they relate, in the case of excited utterance. Therefore they would equate facts so
connected with the fact in issue as to form part of the same tranaction. This
correspondence is understandable. Both exceptions have their roots in res gestae. It is
doubtful if statements of declarant's then existing state of mind relating to future conduct
or plan would qualify as res gestae or under section 7 of the Nigerian Act. However they
may be admitted under section 1 6 of the Act, which seems in pari materia with Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(3). The section provides:
Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention,
knowledge, goodfaith, negligence, rashness, illwill, or goodwill towards
any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or
bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any such state of mind or
body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.
Aguda would seem to doubt if the section is an exception to the hearsay rule. See
AGUDA, supra note 49 at 29 ( asserting that declarations are not admissible under
the section)
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One can safely assert that the exceptions, in both jurisdictions, relating to
res gestae are similar although sections 7 and 1 6 of the Nigerian Act are wider than their
equivalents under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, while the doctrine of res
gestae still applies in Nigeria in its vague form, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
streamlined the doctrine and broken it down into certain easily ascertainable specific
exceptions. There is every reason to suggest the itemised delimitation of the res gestae
doctrine as is done by the Federal Rules of Evidence. If the hearsay rule has been eroded
by many exceptions, the vague exception of res gestae seems to totally emasculate the
rule. By streamlining the doctrine into specific narrow exceptions, the useful aspects of
the doctrine can be retained while the vagueness and ambiguity, associated with it, are
abandoned. This will prove an especially worthwhile venture if one realises that it is such
ambiguity that is the cause of the vilification of the doctrine.
C. Some Hearsay Exceptions Contained in Documents
Fourteen of the twenty four exceptions contained in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 necessarily have to be contained in documents. Three of these are
considered here. These are Recorded recollection (Rule 803 (5) ), Records of regularly
conducted activity(Rule 803 (6) ) and Public records and reports (Rule 803 (8) )}^'^
'^'^ Others are records of vital statistics (Rule 803 (9)); records of religious organizations
(Rule 803 (11)); marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates (Rule 803 (12));
family records (rule 803(13)); records of documents affecting an interest in
property (Rule 804 (14)); statements in documents affecting an interest in
property (Rule 803 (15)); statements in ancient documents (Rule 803 (16));
market reports, commercial publications (Rule 803 (17)); Learned Treatises (Rule
803 (18)); judgment of previous conviction (Rule 803 (22)); judgment as to
personal, family, or general history, or boundaries (Rule 803 (23)). Rule 803(7)
and Rule 803 (10) may also be viewed as documentary but the relation to
documents is indirect as they merely allow evidence to prove absence of entry or
record in specified documents.
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i. Recorded ReCollection
According to Rule 803 (5)
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness :(5) A memorandum or record
concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now
has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the
matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge
correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself"be received as an exhibit unless offered by an
adverse party.
It is curious why this exception is contained in Rule 803 which deals with exceptions
where the declarant need not be unavailable. The first foundational requirement for the
invocation of the exception is that it must be shown that the witness lacks a present
recollection of the matter recorded'*^. This means that he is physically present. But Rule
804, which deals with exceptions applicable only where the declarant is unavailable,
gives unavailability a broad definition which includes "lack of memory of the subject
matter of the declarant's statement". The result is that although the exception comes
under Rule 803, in actuality, to succeed under the exception, the proponent must establish
a particular form of unavailability. The further effect of this special treatment is that the
requirement of unavailability is even stricter in the case of Rule 803(5), for, unlike Rule
804 exceptions. Rule 803 (5) is confined to one form of unavailability.
The second foundational requirement is that the record or memorandum
must correctly reflect the prior knowledge of the declarant.'^' Thirdly, the record or
memorandum must have been made or adopted by the declarant'*' and, finally, it must
'^'^ In Re Corrugated Antitrust Litigation, 756 F.2d 41 1 (5th Cir.1985)
'^' WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.22 at 400
182
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have been made or adopted at a time when the matter in question was fresh in the
declarant's memory'^\
This exception is an extension of Federal Rule of Evidence 612 under
which a witness may refresh his memory by refering to a writing. The difference is that
under Rule 612 the writing is used just to jog the memory of the witness and does not
become evidence.'^'' However, the later provision of Rule 803(5) to the effect that the
record or memorandum may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party'^^ befogs this distinction and is difficult to
rationalize. Ifjurors can listen to its contents, why can't the document be used as exhibit?
The caveat serves no purpose.
One interesting feature of the exception is the centrality of the declarant in
the establishment of the foundational requirements. Most of these have to be established
through the declarant himself Perhaps this is the reason the drafters chose to categorize
the exception as one not requiring proof of unavailability.
The exception is informed by both necessity and reliability. It is necessary
because the alternative may be no evidence at all since the declarant no longer remembers
the facts. It is reliable because the record or memorandum was made at a time when the
matter was fresh in the declarant's memory. It may also be argued that since the declarant
is physically available, he may be cross examined although it is doubtful how useful such
cross examination will be, in view of the declarant's claim of lack of memory.
'«^
Id
184 United States v Rinke, 11% F. 2d 581 (10th Cir.1985)
•'' Clark V City ofLos Angeles, 650 F. 2d 1 1 82 (9th Cir. 1981)
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ii. Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
This exception is contained in Rule 803 (6) which states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness : (6) Records of regularly conducted
activity. A memorandum, report, record or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time
by or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, unless the source of the information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
For admissibility under this rule, it has to be shown that the record or other document was
made in the course of a regularly conducted activity'*^ and the record is such as is
regularly made in the activity. It is doubtful if by "regular" is meant routine. It has been
suggested that the requirement is to show that "the activity recorded is a type which
regularly occurs in the course of the business" day to day activity"'^^ This is wide enough
to include such activities that do not occur frequently but which do occur once in a while
in the course of that type of business. Secondly, the record must have been made by a
person with knowledge of the act, event or condition. This condition is also satisfied
where the maker of the document did so from information supplied by a person with such
knowledge'^^. In the latter situation the person who supplied the information must have
been under a business duty to give the information. Thirdly, the record must have been
"' MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT, VOLUME 1 , 206(1 989)
'«Md
1 WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803. 28, 408-409
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made at or near the time of the transaction to which it relates. '^^ Finally, these foundations
must be laid by the testimony of the custodian of the record or that of other qualified
190
witness.
The rationale for the exception was initially based on necessity but now
the exception also appeals to reliability because the regularity and precision with which
such records are kept guarantee accuracy. This is strengthened by the fact that it is
important for the functioning of business that accurate records be kept.'^'
iii. Public Records and Reports
By Rule 803 (8),
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness : Public records and reports. Records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding however in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
This rule creates three classes of exceptions relating to records of public offices or
agencies. In the first class, are records of the activities of such offices or agencies. The
distinguishing feature of this class is that the records deal with internal activities of the
offices or agencies. The second class deals with records of matters observed by such
"' Id; GRAHAM, supra note 1 86 at 207
"'WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.28, 408-409
'^•id
offices or agencies in the discharge of their legal duties. Unlike records in the first
category, these focus on facts outside the office or agency. However, the rule excludes the
admissibility, in criminal cases, of records of matters observed by police officers and
"other law enforcement personnel", an expression which has been given a broad
interpretation to include "any officer or employee of a governmental agency which has
law enforcement responsibilities".'^^ The third class allows the admissibility of factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. Such
findings are admissible in civil cases. But in criminal cases they are admissible only
against the Government. The exclusion of the use of the second and third categories
against an accused person in a criminal case is geared towards avoiding the constitutional
question of right of confrontation.
The two recurring rationales, for the exceptions to the hearsay rule, are
reflected in this exception. Practical necessity dictates the use of public records and
reports instead of an insistence on live testimony from public officers. Such insistence
will not only be inconvenient but also disruptive of public administration.'''^ Similarly,
because the public officer acts without any motive for bias, the records are presumed to
be free from the hearsay danger of fabrication. Besides, the routine nature of some of the
records ensures their accuracy.'^"
D. Exceptions relating to Documentary Hearsay in Nigeria
The nearest analogue, under Nigerian law, to Federal Rule of Evidence
803 (5) (recorded recollection) is the provision contained in Section 91 of the Evidence
Act. This provision applies in civil proceedings. The section allows the admissibility of
"' United States v Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977)
'" WEISSENBERGER, supra note 135 S. 803.40 at 425
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any statement made, by a person, in a document and tending to establish a fact which
could be proved by direct oral evidence. Two conditions must be met. The maker of the
document must have had personal knowledge of the matters with which the statement
deals or must have made the document in the performance of a duty to record information
supplied by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal
knowledge of those matters. '^^ Secondly, the maker of the document has to be called as
a witness. But this condition need not be satisfied if the maker is dead, or unfit, by reason
of bodily or mental condition, to attend court as a witness, or if he is beyond the seas and
it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or if all reasonable efforts to find
him have been made without success. '^^
Section 91 is the broadest provision under which documentary hearsay can
be received. Such documents can be public'^^ or private. However, while Rule 803 (5) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence is not limited to any particular proceeding, Section 91 is
applicable only in civil cases. '''^ Another point of divergence is that where Rule 803(5)
would require the maker of a document to lack a present recollection of the matter with
which the document deals. Section 9 1 would admit the document even though the maker
recalls its contents. Unlike the business records exception contained in Federal Rule of
Evidence 803 (6), Section 91 of the Nigerian Act does not require that the document be
made in the course of a regularly conducted activity. There is an important similarity
between the two. This is the explicit caution against admissibility where the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. Section 91 goes
•''Section 91 (l)(a)
"'Section 91 (l)(b)
'^^ See Andrews v Cordiner, 1947 K.B. 655 (public document was admitted under an
equivalent provision in an English statute)
"' Lilley v Petit, (1946) K.B. 401
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further to specify such circumstance of untrustworthiness. It precludes admissibility of
any statement made by a person interested, at a time when proceedings were pending or
anticipated, involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to
establish.''^
Although there is no specific exception, under Nigerian law, dealing with
business records. Section 37 of the Act provides for the admissibility of entries in books
of account, regularly kept in the course of business. This provision is more restrictive
than Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (6) because, unlike the latter, it applies only to books
of account. Moreover, such entries are not sufficient evidence to charge any person with
liability. In otherwords they have to be corroborated.
Section 38 of the Nigerian Evidence Act contains an exception comparable
to Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (8). It provides:
An entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a
fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge
of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty
specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register
or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact."°^
This public record exception is different from the Federal Rules of Evidence model in
important respects. As earlier shown. Rule 803 (8) is circumscribed by the requirement
that the record or report must have to brought under one of the three categories contained
in the rule. Moreover, for two of such categories, admissibility is restricted to civil cases
unless the document is tendered against the Government in criminal cases. On the other
hand there is nothing on the face of Section 37 to suggest any distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings. Does the section therefore permit the admissibility of police
"'Section 91 (3)
^°*^ This section was applied in Onyeanwusi v Okukpara, (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 21
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reports in criminal cases? The problem with such reports is that they involve multiple
hearsay. The reports are usually based on information supplied by others. Nigerian law
does not provide for admissibility of multiple hearsay.This is another point of distinction
between the two jurisdictions. As a result, police reports cannot come under Section 37.
Furthermore, Section 35A of the Nigerian Act makes specific provision for police reports
and it is a recognised principle of interpretation that specific provisions override general
ones.2°'
Therefore, even though Section 37 may appear wide enough to encompass
police reports, it must yield to the specific provision in Section 3 5A. This specific
provision gives the court a discretion, in a criminal case, to admit the written statement of
an investigating police officer where the attendance of such officer cannot be procured.
The caveat is that such admission can only be done where the defence does not object to
the statement.""" Here again there is a convergence of United States law and Nigerian law.
The limitation contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) operates to exclude
police reports^°^ while Section 35A achieves a similar result except where the defence
does not object. ^°''
'°' Schroder v Mayor, (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. Part \\Akpan v State, (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. Part
27, 225
'°'Section35A(a)
'"' MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33 S.8.49 at 985
^"^ Other exceptions, to the hearsay rule, relating to contents of documents are provided
for in Section 41 (dealing with certificates by certain public officers) and Section
78(dealing with affidavits)
CHAPTER IV
EXCEPTIONS REQUIRING PROOF OF UNAVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT
A. Uavailability under the Federal Rules of Evidence
The previous chapter examined some hearsay exceptions which apply
whether or not the declarants are available. In contradistinction to those exceptions.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 contains exceptions the applicability of which is
conditioned on a showing of the declarants' unavailability. However, unavailability is
defined in an elastic manner and covers five situations.
The first is a situation where the declarant is exempted by a ruling of the
court, on the ground of privilege, from testifying concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement."*^' The witness must claim the privilege before the court can rule on
it. This is because the privilege is personal to the witness. But it is an open question what
benefit the witness would get from such assertion of privilege if he had, presumably,
earlier waived it by making the declaration which is to be tendered in the absence of his
in court testimony. It seems the law is not prepared to hold that if a person waives his
privilege he does so for all times.
The second situation of unavailability is where the declarant persists in
reftising to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an
order of the court to do so.^'*'^ While a witness who disobeys a court order may be subject
to punishment for contempt, such punishment would not substitute the evidence required
^°^ Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1); See United States v MacClosky, 682 F.2d 468 (4th
Cir. 1982) (witness asserted privilege against self incrimination); United States v
Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978) (witness asserted marital relationship
privilege)
^°^ Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(2)
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in the case. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(2) caters for such lacuna. It enables a
proponent to use any of the hearsay exceptions contained in the rule.^"''
Thirdly, a witness is unavailable who testifies to a lack of memory of the
subject matter of his prior statement.""^ This is the most delicate heading of unavailability.
It may be susceptible to abuse as witnesses may make bogus claims to lack of memory as
a ploy to avoid cross examination. But the characterization of this situation as one of
unavailability has been justified on the ground that:
Rule 804(a)(3) rejects the argument that an assertion of lack of memory in
this context invites perjury from witnesses who seek to avoid being
impeached or cross examined as to the subject matter. Instead, the Rule
adopts the modem position that the value of the admission of the hearsay
statements outweighs the danger arising from the potential for perjury. '°^
It is suggested that the court has to be especially careful in making a finding of
unavailability on the basis of a claim of lack of memory.
The fourth situation, evidencing unavailability, is where the declarant of a
statement is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. ''° Death is the most extreme case of
unavailability in both legal and literal terms. On the otherhand, an illness or infirmity,
may not be absolute and therefore the court would have to consider other alternatives to a
^''^ United States v Carlson, 547 F 2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v Garner, 51
A
F. 2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1978)
^°' Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3); See United States v MacDonald. 688 F.2d 224
(4th Cir. 1982); United States v Davis, 551 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977)
^°^ Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule ofEvidence 804 : Admissible Hearsayfrom an
Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1079, 1084 (1987)
^'° Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4); See Mattox v United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)
(dead declarant held unavailable); United States v Hughes, 422 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir.
1 969) (witness who had psychiatric condition was held unavailable)
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finding of unavailability. If the illness or infirmity is not permanent, a viable option may
be to grant a continuance.^" In the same vein, if the declarant can testify but cannot
physically attend court, arrangement may be made to take his evidence at the place where
he is.2'2
The last situation of unavailability arises where the declarant of the
hearsay statement is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been
unable to procure his attendance ( or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision
(b) (2) (3) or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.^'^
For a finding of unavailability under this heading, the proponent has to show that he has
made reasonable efforts to procure the attendance of the witness. "''' What is reasonable
will depend on the circumstances of each case and the standard may be higher in a
criminal case than in a civil one.
An interesting feature of this heading of unavailability is the requirement
that in addition to the effort to procure the attendance of the declarant, the proponent
should make efforts to obtain his testimony. This additional requirement is limited to
exceptions under Rule 804 (b) (2), (3) and (4). The implication is that where a witness is
absent from the hearing but his evidence is obtained through deposition, the witness is not
unavailable and his evidence is admissible. A conceptual question is the nature of the
deposition. Is it hearsay or non hearsay? If it is viewed as nonhearsay, does that comport
with the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c) as " a statement other than one made by the
'" Peterson v United States, 344 F. 2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965) ( pregnancy is only a
temporary incapacity and a short continuance might have been requested)
^'^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1086
2'^ Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) (5)
^" Government ofCanal Zone v Pinto, 590 F. 2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1979); Barber v Page, 90
U.S. 719(1968)
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declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing..." ? It is arguable that a deposition has
some of the paraphenalia of a court hearing but that does not equate it to a court hearing
especially as the jury is absent. It is more like admissible hearsay in the nature of prior
testimony.
Another issue is the relationship between refusal to testify, under Rule 804
(a) (2), and absence from hearing, under Rule 804 (a) (5). A declarant who is served with
a subpoena but does not attend court can logically be construed as refusing to testify. If
this analysis is correct, it means a proponent of hearsay evidence may avoid the
additional requirement, contained in Rule 804 (a) (5), by relying on Rule 804 (a) (2)
which does not impose the additional burden of making efforts to obtain the declarant's
testimony. Nonetheless, the additional requirement, contained in Rule 804 (a) (5) is
aimed at making the proponent to take the declarant's deposition and offering such
deposition in preference to a hearsay statement .^'^
In all the five instances of unavailability, there is a preclusion of a finding
of unavailability if the situation is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of the hearsay statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying.^'^ This preclusion is of course based on the principle that a party
cannot be allowed to benefit from his own wrong.
B. Unavailability Under the Nigerian Evidence Act
The Evidence Act does not contain a specific provision on unavailability.
But some of the exceptions, analogous to those contained in Federal Rule of Evidence
804, are predicated on some form of unavailability. Unlike Rule 804, which makes the
standard of unavailability uniform for all the exceptions contained in the rule, the
'" MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, S.8.56 at 1011
^'^ Federal Rule of Evidence 804
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Evidence Act has only one broad situation of unavailability applicable to all the
exceptions, while the others are peculiar to a particular exception.
The situation of unavailability applicable to all the hearsay exceptions is
death. Section 33 of the Evidence Act makes statements, made by a person who is dead,
relevant in six situations, while Section 34 makes evidence given by a witness in a
judicial proceeding, or before any person authorized by law to take it, relevant in a
subsequent judicial proceeding, or in a later stage of the same proceeding. In the case of
Section 34 the previous evidence is admissible when the witness is dead or cannot be
found or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way by the adverse party, or
when his presence cannot be obtained without an amount of delay or expense which is
unreasonable.
Whereas, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, privilege, refusal to testify,
lack of memory, inability to testify arising from illness or infirmity, and absence from
hearing are all grounds for the invocation of the hearsay exceptions of dying declaration,
former testimony, statement against interest, statement of personal or family history,
these grounds cannot justify use of similar exceptions under the Nigerian Evidence Act.
However, in the narrow context of former testimony, it appears that a
situation that will lead to a finding of unavailability, under Federal Rule of Evidence 804
(5) (absence from hearing or trial) would, under the Nigerian Act, lead to a finding that
the witness cannot be found or that his presence would occasion an unreasonable delay or
expense.^'^ Furthermore, inability to be present or to testify because of physical or mental
illness or infirmity may be treated as incapacity to give evidence under the Evidence
Act.^'* In similar fashion, if a witness is kept out of the way by an adverse party, this may
217 See Section 34 (1) of the Evidence Act
^'Md
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qualify under the Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) as a refusal to testify or indeed
absence from the hearing.^''
Two situations of unavailability, under Federal Rule of Evidence, do not
have counterparts under Nigerian law. These are privilege and lack of memory of subject
matter. The panacea for lack of memory of subject matter is the use of prior writing to
refresh the witness' memory.'^" The writing is not offered as substantive evidence.
The point must be made that the Draft Evidence Decree attempts to make
the standard of unavailability uniform for all the exceptions. This, it does by widening the
scope of the situations stated in Section 34 of the Evidence Act."' It will be recalled that
under existing law these situations are limited to the exception for former testimony.
However if the Draft Evidence Decree is adopted those situations of unavailability will
extend to such exceptions as statement against interest, statements made in the course of a
business and statements relating to the existence of a relationship.
C. Former Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (1) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as witness : (1) Former Testimony - Testimony given as a
witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a
deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or
another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.
^" Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) (2) and (5)
^^° Section 216 of the Nigerian Evidence Act
^^' See Section 35 of the Draft Evidence Decree
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Besides a showing of unavailability, for hearsay evidence to be admissible under this
exception, it must be shown that the prior evidence was given in a hearing of a
proceeding or in a deposition. It has been suggested that "proceeding" should be given an
expansive meaning to include every process where oath and the other trial safeguards are
present.^^^ It must also be shown that the hearsay opponent or, if it is a civil case, his
predecessor in interest had the opportunity to develop the hearsay testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination. This implies that evidence of a witness in a prior
proceeding may, in a later proceeding, be used against the party who called him in the
earlier proceeding. And this is so whether the evidence was elicited in direct, cross or
redirect examination. If the evidence was given in direct or redirect examination, the
party must be taken to have utilized the opportunity to develop the testimony. If it was
given in cross examination, then much will turn on whether the party had an adequate
opportunity to explore the evidence in redirect examination. A similar analysis attends
evidence given by a witness called by a party other than the hearsay opponent. For such
evidence to be receivable under Rule 804 (b) (1), it must be shown that the hearsay
opponent, or his predecessor in interest, if the case is civil, had an opportunity sufficient
"to render the conduct of cross examination or the decision not to cross examine
meaningful in the light of the circumstances"^'^ which prevailed in the prior proceeding.
In a criminal case, former testimony cannot be used against a defendant
unless he was a party to the prior proceeding. It is not clear whether prior testimony can
be used in favor of a defendant where the prosecutor in the earlier case is different from
the subsequent one. For instance suppose a defendant is prosecuted by a state and later by
federal prosecutors and that the facts giving rise to both prosecutions overlap. Given the
'2^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1096; MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 33, S.8.58 at 1016
"' E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, S.255, 761-62 (3d ed 1984)
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language of Rule 804 (b) (1), evidence given in the state prosecution may not be used
against the federal prosecutors as the latter would not have had an opportunity to develop
testimony given in a proceeding to which they were not a party. Even if it can be argued
that the state prosecutors may be treated as having similar motive to develop the
testimony, as the federal prosecutors have in the subsequent case, the rule limits such
analysis to civil cases. Thus, on the face Rule 804 (b) (1) former testimony may not be
admitted in favor of a defendant where the two proceedings involve different prosecutors.
However this plain interpretation may yield to constitutional due process
considerations.^"^^
In civil cases the rule accommodates a scenario where the hearsay
opponent's predecessor had the opportunity to develop the testimony. In such case the
previous testimony is admissible against the hearsay opponent. The "predecessor in
interest" language, used by the rule, is said to be susceptible to either a narrow
interpretation, limiting it to prior parties with whom the hearsay opponent had privity, or
a liberal interpretation, to include every party whose interest or motive to develop the
testimony is similar to that of the hearsay opponent.^"^ A careful reading of Rule 804 (b)
(1) rejects the latter interpretation. It is clear from the rule that similarity of motive to
develop testimony is an additional foundation (to be laid) to the "predecessor in interest"
requirement. In other words, after a determination that the party in the previous
proceeding was a predecessor in interest to the hearsay opponent, a separate
determination has to be made as to whether such predecessor's motive, in regard to the
testimony, is similar to that of the hearsay opponent in the instant case. Indeed it is
possible that the hearsay opponent was a party to the first case. This, in and of itself,
224 Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 11 05
^^' Id at 1 100; See also Dykes v Raymark Industries, Inc, 801 F. 2d 810 (6th Cir. 1986)
(adopting the liberal interpretation)
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should not conclude the matter. It still has to be determined whether his motive to
develop the testimony in the previous case coincides with his present motive. Therefore
to interpret "predecessor in interest" in terms of similarity of motive to develop testimony
is to confuse the two foundational requirements and that does violence to the language of
Rule 804 (b) (1). "Predecessor in interest" envisages some form of legal succession or
indeed subrogation to rights and obligations.
As already mentioned, the hearsay opponent's motive (or in civil cases, his
predecessor in interest's) to develop the testimony in the previous case must be similar to
his motive in the subsequent case. Similar motive is not particularly precise. Although it
does require identical motive,^^^ it seems that the requirement is that his concerns, in both
cases, regarding the evidence, must be the same. Similar motive appears to have a wider
connotation than identity of issues. The issues for which the evidence is offered need not
be the same in both cases.
The underlying rationales for admissibility of former testimony are
necessity and reliability.''' Since the declarant is unavailable, his live testimony cannot be
had. Since prior testimony was given at a fair adversary hearing with all trial safeguards,
it is presumed to be reliable. ^^^
The Nigerian version of the exception for former testimony is found in
Section 34 of the Evidence Act. The section authorizes the reception of former testimony
where the witness is unavailable on account of any of the situations earlier stated. These
are when the witness is dead, cannot be found, is incapable of giving evidence, is kept
out of the way by the adverse party or his presence carmot be obtained without an
^^^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1 099
^^' Id at 1095
''' CARLSON, IMWINKELRID AND KIONKA, supra note 24 at 687
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unreasonable delay or expense. In addition, other foundational facts are required. The
proponent has to show that
(a) the first proceeding was between the same parties involved in the instant case or their
representatives in interest;
(b) the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right and opportunity to cross
examine^^*^; and
(c) the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second
proceeding.
The section is stricter, on the question of the connection between both
proceedings, than is the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 804 (b) (1), the focal
point is the relationship of the hearsay opponent to the earlier case. The nexus between
the proponent and the first case is irrelevant. But under Section 34 of the Nigerian Act,
not only must the hearsay opponent, or his representative in interest, be shown to have
been a party to the previous case, it must also be established that the proponent, or his
representative in interest, was a party to the earlier case. It is however suggested that the
more tolerant tenor of Rule 804 (b) (1) is preferable as it caters for the concern for
fairness to the hearsay opponent without unduly excluding helpful evidence. Again
whereas the Federal Rules of Evidence make a distinction between criminal and civil
cases, Section 34 of the Evidence Act does not distinguish between the forms of
proceedings.
Although Section 34 is differently worded, from Rule 804 (b) (l)'s
language of "an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross
or redirect examination", its requirement that "the adverse party in the first proceeding
had the right and opportunity to cross examine" is wide enough to cover evidence elicited
'" See R V Ijoma, (1961) ALL N.L.R. 518
^'° See State v Friday, (1970-71) 1 E.C.S.L.R. 24
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from a witness, called by the hearsay opponent in the earlier case. All that is required is
that the party against whom the evidence was given in the earlier case must have had
opportunity to cross examine. This requirment may not even be insisted upon where the
prior testimony was given at the instance of the hearsay opponent.
Another marked distinction between Rule 804 (b) (1) and Section 34 is
that the latter requires identity of issues in both the previous and the later cases, whereas
the former requires that the motive to develop the testimony should be similar in both
cases. Rule 804 (b) ( 1 ) focuses more on the concern of the hearsay opponent while
Section 34 is more legalistic and therefore stricter.
D. Dying Declaration
The old common law exception to the hearsay rule, known as dying
declaration, finds expression, in a modified form, in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (2)
which reads as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: (2) Statement under belief of impending death.-
In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding, a
statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be impending death.
At common law the dying declaration exception was limited to homicide cases. This was
severely criticised as being irrational since the underlying philosophy applies to other
cases.
^^' Although commentators suggested the elimination of the restriction of the
exception to homicide cases. Rule 804 (b) (2) opts for a cautious approach and merely
extends the exception to civil cases "where the stakes do not involve possible
"' See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, SS 1436
(Chadboume ed 1974) 227 S285; E. CLEARY, supra note 223, S. 283 at 830
79
imprisonment""^^ while retaining it for homicide cases "where exceptional need for the
evidence is present".^"
The declarant must have had personal knowledge of the matter asserted
and must have believed that death was imminent.^^'' The test is subjective and should be
whether a particular declarant believed that his death was imminent, and not whether a
reasonable man in the declarant's position would so believe. ~^^ The declarant need not
die. He can become unavailable in any of the other senses contained in Rule 804 (a).
However, in homicide cases the declarant is usually dead, although there is nothing in the
language of the rule confining the use of the declaration to homicide cases involving the
death of the declarant. In other words, in principle, it is possible to use a statement made
by a declarant in a trial for the homicide of a person other than the declarant. But in that
situation the declarant must be shown to have been in apprehension of his own death not
that of the other person.
To be admissible, the statement must relate to the cause or circumstances
of what the declarant believed to be impending death. Where the statement is a
description of the cause of perceived imminent death, it is usually simple to apply, but
difficulty arises where it relates to the circumstances of perceived impending death. Must
the particular circumstance relate directly to the death or would remote circumstances
suffice? It has been suggested that the court should focus on the nexus between the time
^^^ Fed. R. Evidence 804 (b) (2) Advisory Committee Note ; See also Rick A. Howard,
Hearsay Exceptions - The Dying Declaration : Return to its Original Application,
19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 481 (1995)
"Md
^^"^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209, 1 109-1 110; See also United States v Lemonakis,
485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ( suicide note, written six days before death, was
held inadmissible as there was no indication of apprehension of death)
^^^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1110
so
and circumstances of the event, and the expected death. ^''^ One may add that the court
should exclude a declaration where the connection is remote.
Necessity, stemming from the unavailability of the declarant, informs the
use of this exception."" Where the declarant is dead such necessity becomes absolute.
The statement is also considered reliable since it is thought that a dying person would not
want to meet his Maker with a lie on his lips."^* Even if it is argued that this justification
presumes a religious persuasion, it is said that in a more secular world the thought
persists that psychological forces which occur at the point of death eliminate the
possibility of falsehood. ^^^ Eyre C.B. articulated these considerations in these words :
The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that
they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive to
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful
considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful, is
considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by a positive oath administered in a court ofjustice. ^"^
Rule 804 (b) (2)'s equivalent, under Nigerian law. is Section 33(a) of the Evidence Act,
which makes statements, made by a person who is dead, relevant when the statement is
made by the deceased:
""Id at 1112
"'Id at 1108
"'Id at 1107
"" MUELLER AND KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, S. 8.61 at 1033: But see Glen
Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1 107 for a suggestion that such psychological
stress may cause flaws in perception and narration.
240 R V Woodcock, (1789) 1 Leach 500 at 502: 168 E.R.353
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as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the
transaction which resuhed in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
person's death comes into question; such statements are relevant only in
trials for murder or manslaugter of the deceased person and only when
such person at the time of making such declaration believed himself to be
in danger of approaching death although he may have entertained at the
time of making it hopes of recovery.
The Nigerian version of dying declaration is more restrictive. It does not apply to civil
cases and is still limited to homicide cases. And not even to all homicide cases, but to
only those involving the death of the particular declarant and in which the cause or
circumstances of the transaction leading to such death are in issue. Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 804 (b) (2), the declarant need not be dead. His declaration may be admitted
in a civil case or in a homicide trial resulting from the death of another person. On the
otherhand. Section 33 (a) applies only where the particular declarant is dead and only in
respect of a homicide trial resulting from his death.
The central consideration in both jurisdictions is the declarant's belief of
impending death. But while Rule 804 (b) (2) requires a belief that death is imminent,
Section 33 (a) requires simply a belief in danger of approaching death. ^"^ Moreover, under
Nigerian law, the declarant may entertain hopes of recovery. It means that the declarant
need not subjectively believe in certainty of imminent death. Rule 804 (b) (2) seems to
retain the old English requirement of "settled hopeless expectation of death", ^'*" while
Section 33 (a) appears more liberal on this point. The qualification, under Section 33 (a),
that the declarant may entertain hopes of recovery is vague and has not received much
judicial attention. It is difficult to reconcile it to the requirement of belief in danger of
approaching death. While one may not urge the requirement of an absolute expectation of
'" Kuse V The State, (1969) N.M.L.R. 153 S.C. ; Garba and Another v R, (1959) 4 F.S.C.
162
242 Shepardv United States, 290 U.S. 96, 99 (1933) (Justice Cardozo);
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death or belief in certainty of death, as appHes in the United States, it is suggested that the
requirement of belief in "danger of approaching death" is sufficiently liberal and should
not be further watered down.
The strictures imposed by the requirement of belief in danger of
approaching death and the confinement of dying declarations to homicide cases have
come under criticisms.^"'' As a result, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission proposes the
elimination of both restrictions.^"'' This complete radical overhaul of the dying declaration
exception is hardly desirable. It is conceded that the scope of the exception should be
expanded. Most jurisdictions, including the United States, now apply the exception in
civil cases. This is justifiable because the underlying rationale, presumed reliability, is
not peculiar to any proceeding. Thus the proposal to extend the exception to other
proceedings is welcome. But to remove the requirement that the declarant must believe
himself to be in danger of approaching death is to deprive the exception of its substratum.
This will rob dying declaration of its fundamental philosophical underpinning. The result
will be a free flow of reliable and unreliable hearsay under the guise of dying declaration.
E. Statements Against interest
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b) (3) provides an exception, to the hearsay rule, in these
terms:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witnes: (3) Statement against interest . - A statement
which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant
to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement
24.t See Workshop Papers on the Reform of the Evidence Act, supra note 55, 66-67
^"^ See Section 36 of the Draft Evidence Decree
83
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
In addition to the general requirement of unavailability, applicable to all Rule 804
exceptions, some foundational elements must be established for the statement against
interest exception. First, the declarant must have had personal knowledge of the fact.^''^
However, it seems this requirement may be qualified if multiple hearsay is applicable.
The most important foundational requirement, and by far the most controversial, is that
the statement must be against any of the stated interests of the declarant."''^ These are
pecuniary, proprietary or penaP^^ interests. Apparently, it is believed that these are
important interests with which persons would not toy unless the statements are true.
Although the rule is silent on mixed statements, i.e statements that are both disserving
and self serving or neutral at the same time, the preponderance of judicial^"* and
academic^'*'' opinion is that the court should scrutinize such statements and exclude those
parts that are not against interest or are merely collateral to the parts against interest.
Where the statement exculpates an accused person, it must be corroborated before it is
admissible.^^°
^''^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1 1 1
5
246 j^
'"' United States v Thomas, 571 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978)
^'' United States v Seyfried, 435 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v Lilley, 581 F.2d
182 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v Porter, 881 F.2d 878 (10 Cir. 1989);
Williamson v United States, 1 14 S.Ct.2431 (1994)
^"^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 198 at 1 120; Michael M. Martin, The Supreme Court
Rules On Statements Against Interest, 1 1 Touro L. Rev 179 (1994)
''' FRE 804 (b) (3)
S4
A statement against interest can be admitted in favor of or against a party
and this is one feature that distinguishes it from its look alike - admission. ^^' Another
distinction is that admission is non hearsay whereas statement against interest is merely
admissible hearsay.^^^ Besides, admission must be made by a party to the proceeding at
the time of litigation whereas, a statement against interest is usually made prior to the
case, by an out of court declarant who would have been a witness in the case.^"
The rationale for admissibility of such statements is founded in both
reliability and necessity. Like all Rule 804 exceptions, since the declarant is unavailable,
a choice has to be made between his hearsay evidence and no evidence at all. Against the
background that self interest dictates that a person will not make a statement against his
interest unless it is true, the law opts to fill the vacuum, that is created by the
unavailability of the declarant, with his hearsay statement which in the circumstance has a
reasonable guarantee of trustworthiness.'^''
The Nigerian equivalent of the exception for statement against interest is
contained in section 33(c) of the Evidence Act which provides that:
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is
dead are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: ( c ) when the
statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person
making it and the said person had peculiar means of knowing the matter
and had no interest to misrepresent it.
251 Glen Weissenberger, supra note 1 98 at 1117
2" Id
253
Id. See also CARLSON. IMWINKELRIED AND KIONKA, Supra note 24
2'" Glen Weissenberger, Supra note 198 at CARLSON, IMWINKELRIED AND
KIONKA, supra note 24
as
The only allowable situation of unavailability for this exception is death. This contrasts
with the Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) which admits of other forms of
unavailability. Furthermore, Section 33(c) retains the common law limitation of this
exception to statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests, thereby excluding
statements which expose the declarants to criminal liability. This limitation, which was
severely criticized'^^ and has been abandoned in the United States, lacks justification. It is
strange how a casual statement admitting liability for a debt is more reliable than an
admission, or in fact a confession, of guilt to a criminal offense. Happily, in addition to
expanding the scope of unavailability, the Draft Evidence Decree abandons this arbitrary
dichotomy and widens the scope of the exception to cover statements exposing the
declarant to penal liability.
The express requirement, under section 33 (c), for the declarant to have
had a peculiar means of knowing the matter to which his statement relates does not differ
markedly from the basic evidentiary rule, in both jurisdictions, that a witness generally
should have personal knowledge of the matter to which he testifies. This is of course
subject to the exceptions relating to hearsay. Similarly, while Rule 804 (b)(3) does not
expressely stipulate a requirement that the declarant must have had no interest to
misrepresent, as does section 33(c) of the Nigerian Act, a holistic reading of the rule
operates to mandate a like requirement. By the objective test of whether "a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true," the rule obliges the court to look into the circumstances and context in which
the statement was made.^^^ This will compel the exclusion of statements against interest if
the declarant had other ulterior motives than the seeming concession.
2" 5 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, SS 1401-14
(Chadboum ed. 1974); E. CLEARLY, supra note 223, S 278, at 674; Morgan,
Declarations Against Interest, 5 Vand. L Rev. 451, 472 (1952).
^^^ Glen Weissenberger, supra note 209 at 1 121.
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F. Other Exceptions
The remaining specific exception under Rule 804, statement of personal or family history,
also has a counterpart under Nigerian law.'" The significant difference is that unlike Rule
804 (b) (4), Section 33 (e) of the Nigerian Evidence Act retains the common law
restriction, of the exception, to statements made before the question, in relation to which
it is to be proved, had arisen.
Mention must also be made of the residual exceptions contained in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.'^* Two such exceptions exist. They are similar except that
one^^^ does not require proof of unavailability while the other^'"" does. The rules admit
statements not specifically covered by any of the enumerated specific exceptions to the
hearsay rule. However, the statements must have circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to those possessed by the enumerated exceptions and the court
must determine that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) it is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of the
rules and the interest of justice will best be served by the admission of the statement into
evidence. Moreover, the proponent of the statement is required to give, the adverse party,
advance notice of his intention to offer the statement in evidence and the particulars of
the statement including the name and address of the declarant.
The residual exceptions are traced to the case of Dallas County v
Commercial Union Association Co,^^^ where the Fifth Circuit held that a fifty years old
^" See Section 33 (e) of the Nigerian Evidence Act.
''' FRE 803 (24) and FRE 804 (b) (5)
'" FRE 803 (24).
''° FRE 804 (b) (5)
261 286 F. 2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961); See also James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay
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newspaper article, which did not fit in any recognised hearsay exception, but which
possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, could be admitted.
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were to be drafted, the decision in Dallas County
was codified in the form of the residual exceptions. The adoption was a compromise
between the need for certainty, in the province of evidence, and the desirable need for
flexibility. The residual exceptions are sufficiently flexible to enable courts to decide, on
a case by case basis, the admissibility of statements not fitting any particular hearsay
exception. At the same time some mandatory guidelines are given. These are in the nature
of the five foundational requirements which must be met. The first and most important is
that the statement must possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that are
equivalent to those of the specific exceptions. Certain courts interpret this requirement in
terms of the existence of other evidence corroborative of the hearsay statement"^^ while
others focus more on whether the circumstances at the time of the making of the
statement provide guarantees of trustworthiness. ^^^
Most of the specific hearsay exceptions are justified on the basis of the
absence or mitigation of the hearsay dangers. To make a finding that an out of court
statement, not fitting any of the specific exceptions, possesses equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, the court should examine the extent to which the hearsay
dangers of faulty perception, faulty memory, ambiguity and insincerity are reduced.
Exception Reconsidered. 20 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 787, 791-794 (1993); Howard S.
Chansanow and Jose Felipe Anderson, The Residual Hearsay Exceptions:
Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U.Bah. L. Rev. 1,9-10 (1994); David A.
Sonesheine, The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in
Search ofa Rule, 57 N.Y.U L. Rev. 867, 868 - 871 (1982)
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United States v Barnes, 586 F. 2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v Ward, 552 F
2d 1080 (5th Cir.) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977)
Huff V White Motor Corp. 609 F. 2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979). See generally Sonesheine,
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A controversial question is the application of the residual exceptions to
statements which narrowly miss qualification, and admission, under a specific exception.
Some courts hold that such statements do possess equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness and therefore admit them.^^"* Others rightly hold that the residual
exceptions are not to be used to circumvent the requirements of the specific exceptions,
and therefore reject such statements. ^^^ It is an accepted rule of interpretation that specific
provisions override the general ones. Thus if a statement can be considered under a
specific exception but does not pass the test of admissibility under that specific exception,
it should not be admitted through a residual exception. To do otherwise is to subvert the
bases for the specific exceptions.
The second requirement for admissibility, under the residual exceptions, is
that the statement must be offered to prove a material fact. This is like a restatement of
the rule of relevancy. Thirdly, the statement must be more probative on the point, for
which it is offered, than any other evidence reasonably available to the proponent. This
entails two elements. In the first place, the proponent must show that the statement has
greater tendency, in logic, to establish the fact for which it is offered, than any other
available evidence. '^^ Secondly, he must show that he could not, with reasonable efforts,
obtain another evidence more probative than the statement.^^^
The fourth foundational requirement is that it must be shown that the
general purpose of the rules, and the interests of justice will be best served by admitting
^'^ United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, (5th Cir.) rehearing denied, 545 F. 2d 168
(1976); United States v McPartlin, 595 F. 2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) cert, denied,
444 U.S. 833(1980)
^^^ Zenith Radio Corp. V Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp.l 190 (E.D. Pa.
1980)
^^^ Sonesheine, supra note 261 at 890
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the statement. It appears this requirement is an invitation to the court to consider all the
circumstances, on a case by case basis, and to balance the competing interests as best it
can.
Finally there is a requirement of notice. According to Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the proponent must give sufficient notice to the
opponent, in advance of trial or hearing, so as to enable the latter to have a fair
oppurtunit>' to prepare to meet the hearsay statement. Although the language of the rules
suggests advance notice, some courts apply a liberal interpretation to permit notice given
even in the course of trial, provided the opponent gets a continuance in order to
adequately prepare to meet the statement.^^* There are however some which apply the
requirement of notice strictly.'*''^ A strict interpretation would frustrate the obvious
legislative intent behind the requirement of notice. The paramount consideration is the
provision of adequate oppurtunity for the opponent to prepare to meet the hearsay
statement. Even where pre-trial notice is not given, the grant of a continuance will meet
that need.
There are no provisions under the Nigerian Evidence Act comparable to
the residual exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The nearest is the general
provision in Section 6 (a) empowering the court to exclude evidence of facts which
though relevant or deemed to be relevant to the issue, appears to it to be too remote to be
material in all the circumstances of the case. Yet, there is no correspondence between this
provision and the residual exceptions. The provision applies to all types of evidence
unlike the residual exceptions which apply only to hearsay evidence. Besides, the
provision authorises rejection of otherwise admissible evidence whereas the residuals
^'' United States v. Carlson. 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S.914
(1977); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979)
'"' United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2nd Cir. 1977)
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authorise admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. It can be safely asserted that
while Nigerian law on hearsay appears to track United States law, the residual exceptions
represent a marked distinction between both jurisdictions.
There are other exceptions to the hearsay rule in both countries. ^^° The
few exceptions considered above are the very popular and more recurring ones.
'^" For the United States these are absence of records kept in accordance with the
provisions of FRE 803 (6) (FRE 803 (7)); Records of vital statistics (FRE 803(9));
Absence of public record or entry (FRE 803 (10)); Records of religious
organizations (FRE 803 (11)); Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates (FRE
803(12)); family records (FRE 803(13)); Records of documents affecting an
interest in property (FRE 803(14)); Statements in documents affecting an interest
in property (FRE 803(15)); Statements in ancient documents (FRE 803(16));
Market reports, commercial publications (FRE 803(17)); Learned Treatises (FRE
803(18)); Reputation concerning personal or family history (FRE 803(19));
Reputation concerning boundaries or general history (FRE 803(20)); Reputation
as to character (FRE 803(21)); Judgment of previous conviction (FRE 803(22));
Judgment as to personal, family, or general history, or boundaries (FRE 803(23)).
For Nigeria these are, admissions and confessions sections (19 - 32 Evidence Act);
Declarations as to public and general rights (Section 33(d)); pedigree declarations
(Section 33(e)); declaration by testators (Section 33(f)); judgments (Sections 49 -
56); affidavits (Section 78)).
CONCLUSION
This discourse reveals that hearsay evidence is viewed with similar concern in the United
States and in Nigeria. The definition of the concept in the one jurisdiction corresponds to
its definition in the other, and except for minor variations, like the absence of jury trials
in Nigeria, the maintenance of the rule, rendering hearsay evidence inadmissible,
proceeds from the same bases. This similarity is hardly surprising. Both jurisdictions are
founded on the common law, of which the rule against hearsay evidence is a common
feature.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between the operation of the
rule in the two jurisdictions. While the rule has received an almost exhaustive legislative
treatment in Federal Rules of Evidence 801-805, it is still a matter ofjudicial construction
crafted from terse provisions in the Nigerian Evidence Act. The result is the acdemic, but
practically implausible, issue whether the hearsay rule is part of Nigerian law. The paper
demonstrated that all concerned regard the rule as part of lex Nigeriana. However, there
is urgent need for a fuller legislative treatment of the of rule. The United States model,
which contains specific provisions on various aspects of hearsay, ranging from its
definition to exceptions to the rule, may provide guidance. The merit of the Federal Rules
of Evidence provisions on hearsay is the concentration on statements. This reduces the
confusion between hearsay and relevancy, although it does not totally eliminate it. Since
the Nigerian version of the rule is by implication, this confusion is ever present. Some of
the exceptions, considered in this work, are couched in the language of relevancy. Yet the
law maintains a distinction between relevancy and admissibility. The former deals with
what need to be proved and the latter with the means of proving facts. While relevancy is
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a condition precedent to admissibility, the hearsay rule is more of a rule of
inadmissibility.
The paper noted current reform effort which has taken cognizance of this
point. However, the approach of the Law Reform Commission, as shown in the
provisions of the Draft Evidence Decree, to which the paper alluded, is far from
satisfactory. The definition of hearsay is not clear enough. The exceptions are still drafted
in the language of relevancy. It is hoped that the Commission will, in its further review of
the draft, take care of these details. In doing so reference to the structure of the United
States Federal Rules of Evidence may prove helpful.
An inescapable point to be made about the Federal Rules of Evidence is
the unwholesome pervasiveness of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay evidence. A
rule which admits of twenty nine exceptions is akin to being non existent. No wonder
some regard the rule as a fiction. Some of the exceptions overlap and may be merged.
The extensiveness of the exceptions appears an unwieldy compromise. None of the
leading reform proposals'^' contests the necessity for a rule restricting the admissibility of
hearsay. Against this backdrop, and in view of the several rationales discussed in the
work, what is required is a re-invention of the rule. Existing doctrine is loose. Most
statements can be admitted under the expansive exceptions. That is if they qualify as
hearsay."^'' There is need to streamline the exceptions. Otherwise the issue really is
271 Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1339
(1987) (suggesting that hearsay be admissible if the proponent presents
foundation facts enabling the trier of facts to intelligently evaluate it); Park, supra
note 89 (suggesting the liberalization of hearsay in civil cases while retaining the
rule against hearsay in criminal cases); Seigel, supra note 70 (suggesting that
hearsay be admissible if it is the best evidence); C. A. OPUTA, MODERN BAR
ADVOCACY, 48 (1982) (suggesting that hearsay be admissible from defence but
not from prosecutor)
272 Professor Fenner concludes that everything can be nonhearsay and everything can
come under the exceptions. See Fenner, supra note 17, 10-36. Some also maintain
that judicial practice further erodes the rule. See Myma S. Raeder, The Hearsay
Rule at Work: Has it been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 Minn.
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whether there is a rule against hearsay, and, if not, whether one is needed. To be or not to
be, that is the hard question!
L. Rev. 507 (1992) and contrast with Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work:
Has it been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473
(1992).
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